U.S. Occupation of Japan

U.S. Occupation of Japan

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On August 30, 1945, U.S. NBC coverage of the event includes news of released POWs and the general's good spirits as he descends the ramp of his four-engine C-54.

Feminism and the Cold War in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 1945 – 1952 米軍占領下の日本におけるフェミニズムと冷戦、1945−1952年

On August 15, 1945, World War II came to an end with Japan's unconditional surrender. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), flew from the Philippines to Japan with a mission to occupy and demilitarize the defeated nation. The place and manner of MacArthur&rsquos arrival seemed to signal the victor&rsquos absolute confidence and unquestioned authority over its vanquished enemy. MacArthur &ndash the embodiment of U.S. military power and a consummate actor well known for his grand performance &ndash landed at the Atsugi Airfield, previously a training field for Japanese kamikaze fighters, with a handful of Allied troops. MacArthur himself was armed only with a corncob pipe. Despite his staff&rsquos concern about possible attacks by enemy soldiers not yet disarmed, MacArthur&rsquos triumphant landing was followed by a smooth procession to the New Grand Hotel in Yokohama and later an entry into Tokyo where he established the General Headquarters (GHQ) of SCAP in the Dai-ichi Seimei Insurance Building. A new chapter of postwar U.S.-Japan relations thus opened with richly gendered and racialized symbolism: the United State&rsquos imposition of white masculine military authority over Japan, now a defeated and subjugated nation in the Far East.

Following the ferocious belligerence between the enemies in World War II, many Japanese feared that the objective of the occupation was to punish Japan. Yet, MacArthur declared U.S. intentions benign and noble: to "reorient" and "rehabilitate" Japan into a modern, democratic, and enlightened nation. Perceiving the Japanese as an "alien race of spiritual growth stunted by long tenure under the physical, mental and cultural strictures of feudal precepts," he was supremely confident of his ability to transplant American ideals to Japan and to civilize its subjects. He had what he considered evidence to support his conviction: a half century of U.S. governance in the Philippines had demonstrated America's capacity to "civilize" an alien and inferior race and lay the foundations for "democracy" abroad. Just as the U.S. policy of "benign assimilation" in the Philippines had uplifted its subjects from a state of ignorance and savagery, so would the U.S. occupation give the Japanese an unprecedented opportunity for civilization and enlightenment. 1

It was within this context of the American project to civilize and democratize a racially inferior other that Japanese women as gendered subjects emerged as centrally important figures. Seen by the occupation authorities as victims for centuries of "Oriental male chauvinism," Japanese women embodied feudal tradition, backwardness, and lack of civilization. As helpless women of color, they became ideal candidates for American salvation and emancipation. The occupier's zeal for liberation of Japanese women from indigenous male domination was all-consuming and multifaceted. MacArthur granted suffrage to Japanese women and praised their "progress" under U.S. tutelage as setting an example for the world. 2 Other male occupiers "emancipated" Japanese women by initiating various constitutional and legal changes and policies. Following a familiar colonial trope of heterosexual rescue and romance, some American men expressed their desire to save Japanese women in more personal ways: Earnest Hoberecht, a correspondent for United Press International, advocated kissing as a path to liberation&rsquo 3 Raymond Higgins, the military governor stationed in Hiroshima, married his Japanese maid to "save" her from the aftermath of the atomic bomb and her abusive husband. 4

The postwar U.S.-Japan encounter involved dynamics that went beyond the colonial trope of heterosexual romance, however. No less earnest in their attempt to emancipate and transform Japanese women were American women reformers in the occupation forces. Beate Sirota Gordon, a twenty-two-year-old European Jewish immigrant to the US who had spent early years in Japan, pushed for a constitutional guarantee of gender equality &ndash a guarantee nonexistent in the United States &ndash as &ldquothe only woman in the room&rdquo where American male reformers debated the contours and content of postwar Japanese constitution.

Gordon in the Occupation

A group of American women occupiers led by Ethel Weed worked tirelessly to implement the ideal of gender equality and transform Japanese women at the grassroots level. Using skits, role playing, pamphlets, among others, women occupiers such as Carmen Johnson and Helen Hosp Seamans disseminated the spirit and practice of &ldquodemocracy&rdquo among Japanese women with whom they often formed strong bonds that continued well after the occupation. These American women's passion for gender reform was all the more remarkable, as they were utterly unfamiliar with Japan, with few exceptions had no Japanese language skills, received no extensive training for their task, and were often relegated to marginal positions within the predominantly male SCAP bureaucracy. Many Japanese women enthusiastically welcomed American reformers and their efforts to democratize Japan, and tapped into shared discursive repertoires of gender equality and democracy to articulate their own visions of postwar womanhood. For some, such as Katō Shizue, the occupation provided unprecedented opportunities to collaborate with American reformers and to promote herself as the feminist leader in postwar Japan. Even those who explicitly challenged American rule, such as Nosaka Ryō and Miyamoto Yuriko who were communist writer-activists and champions of working-class women's causes, also benefited from the occupation as they stepped into a new space opened up by American reformers to articulate their own visions of gender and nation in postwar Japan.

Kato Shidzue with Margaret Sanger

Over the past six decades, belief in the successful transformation of Japanese women's lives provided many occupiers and subsequent generations of Americans with "unquestionable" evidence that U.S. interventions in Japan were beneficent. The picture of Japanese women being liberated from feudal male domination and gaining new rights under U.S. tutelage is also etched in the minds of many Japanese, and is understood as a turning point in the history of Japan. The view of the occupation as a remarkably generous effort by the victor to democratize Japan and emancipate its women has constituted a gendered historical account shaping American and Japanese self-understandings.

Rethinking the Occupation: Women, Gender, and Cold War US Imperialism

Pedagogy of Democracy: Feminism and the Cold War in the U.S. Occupation of Japan (Temple University Press, 2008) intervenes in the triumphant narrative of the occupation, women, and democracy to provide a critical feminist perspective. Rather than assessing the impact of constitutional revision, civil code reform, and other gender reform on Japanese women, it traces how the occupation opened up a new space where American and Japanese women would articulate certain forms of feminism by drawing on prewar notions of gender, race, nation and empire and refitting them to the Cold War context of anti-communism and imperial expansionism. Far from a moment of women's liberation, the occupation's gender reform was a case of "imperial feminism" 5 where the agenda of "women's emancipation" became deeply intertwined with imperialist dynamics of gender, race, class, and nation, turning American and Japanese women into complicit participants in the Cold War.

Specifically, during the occupation, American women participated in U.S. imperialism by disseminating Cold War discourses of femininity and domesticity and promoting the Americanization of postwar Japan in the name of women&rsquos emancipation. Such a project of women&rsquos emancipation was inspired by, and in turn promoted and justified, U.S. imperial expansionism, sustaining the pattern of feminism's collaboration with nationalist and imperialist politics that had emerged since the late nineteenth century. At the same time, American women also subverted the dominant structure of power, as their participation in gender reform in a foreign country visibly contradicted the Cold War notion of women safely contained within domestic boundaries.

Equally complex dynamics were observed among Japanese women. Japanese middle-class women enthusiastically welcomed the occupiers&rsquo reform project and embraced American discourses of democracy and gender equality, while also re-circulating prewar and wartime discourses of women, family, and nation in order to reassert their own respectability as &ldquoJapanese women.&rdquo 6 Despite their complicity in dominant dynamics of power, Japanese women also developed a close personal bond with American women reformers, deviating however subtly from the Cold War tenet of heterosexual normativity and causing anxiety among American male occupiers. At times, Japanese women&rsquos resistance led to outcomes at odds with the occupation authorities. Women unionists openly defied the Americans by participating in communist-led labor protests and praising gender policies in the Soviet Union and China. However, they also hewed generally to Cold War ideals of domesticity and heterosexuality and stigmatized poor, economically displaced women who earned their means as prostitutes. In U.S.-occupied Japan, then, American and Japanese women were constantly stepping in and out of the dominant apparatus of power, sometimes reinforcing and at other times undermining an emerging structure of hegemony. Recast from a critical feminist perspective, the U.S. occupation of Japan becomes an extraordinarily dynamic and multifaceted story about women&rsquos negotiations with power. Simultaneous tenacity and instability of hegemony, and unpredictable and ironic outcomes of political mobilization attempted in the name of women&rsquos liberation, constitute the major facets of this historical drama.

Pan Pan girls soliciting during the Occupation

In analyzing the occupation as a case of Cold War imperial feminism, I create an interdisciplinary dialogue among occupation studies, feminist colonial and postcolonial studies, and Cold War cultural studies, each one of which highlights the centrality of gender for critical understandings of nineteenth- and twentieth-century global politics. As discussed below, this interdisciplinary dialogue not only results in richer analysis of the occupation itself it also challenges each discipline to consider some of its preexisting analytical and empirical assumptions.

Occupation Studies

Since the end of World War II, the task of documenting and evaluating the U.S. occupation of Japan has generated numerous and contentious debates among scholars and journalists in Japan and the United States, resulting in a large body of work collectively referred to as occupation studies, or senryō kenkyū. Spearheaded by such notable scholars as John Dower, Carol Gluck, and Takemae Eiji among others, the field has produced diverse interpretations of the occupation, 7 including recent critical studies such as John Dower&rsquos Embracing the Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II and Yukiko Koshiro&rsquos Trans-Pacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan. 8 John Dower situates the occupation within the larger context of imperial culture, history, and politics and provides a genealogical perspective on race and racism. Observing American racism toward Japan during the war and the postwar occupation, he argues that American understanding of self as civilized and superior and Japan as uncivilized and inferior can be traced back not only to "racial stereotypes that Europeans and Americans had applied to nonwhites for centuries: during the conquest of the New World, the slave trade, the Indian Wars in the United States, the agitation against Chinese immigrants in America, the colonization of Asia and Africa, the U.S. conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century," but more generally to the long-standing Western colonial vocabularies of the superior West and the inferior Orient/Other. 9 Defining the occupation as an instance of "imperial democracy" driven by the notion of white supremacy, he argues that "[f]or all its uniqueness of time, place, and circumstance &ndash all its peculiarly 'American' iconoclasm &ndash the occupation was&hellipbut a new manifestation of the old racial paternalism that historically accompanied the global expansion of the Western powers." 10 Dower illuminates how within the context of American imperial democracy and racism Japanese actively engaged in a diverse range of political negotiations with the occupiers &ndash from collaboration to manipulation to resistance &ndash at the grassroots and intergovernmental levels.

Focusing on the parallel and mutually reinforcing development of American and Japanese racism and imperialism, Yukiko Koshiro argues that race constituted a common discursive ground where the two former enemies came to affirm each other's standing in international hierarchies, which led to "successful" and indeed "smooth" Cold War alliance making. Adopting Western imperial discourses of racial and national hierarchies (i.e., the superiority of self and the inferiority of others) to engineer its own colonial expansionism in Asia, Imperial Japan had constructed itself as an "honorary white," a nation capable of assimilating into superior Western culture and civilization while standing apart from and above other inferior Asians. Despite its challenge to Western imperialism during the war, Japan had affirmed and reinforced Western imperial understanding of white supremacy, and Western nations in turn had accepted to an extent Japan's sense of superiority to Asia and proximity to the West. This mutual dependency of Western and Japanese racism continued into the postwar years. After a short period of time during which race was used as a punitive tool to put Japan back in its "proper place," the United States actively cultivated and even manipulated Japan's admiration toward the West and its distance from the rest of Asia to transform the former enemy into an effective Cold War ally. As Koshiro argues, race and racism functioned as a source of productive power during the occupation. 11

Despite its enormous contributions, however, occupation historiography has primarily been a &ldquomasculine&rdquo field of studies. Women may enter into discussions of the occupation in descriptive terms but are rarely treated as a central site of analysis where the occupation-time political and cultural dynamics could be reexamined and reinterpreted from new perspectives. Equally or more problematically, existing studies have hardly taken gender as an important category of historical analysis whose intersection with other vectors of power such as race, class, and nation deeply informed postwar U.S.-Japan negotiations.

Influenced by the increasing saliency of women's studies since the late 1970s, women scholars in the United States and Japan have begun to focus on women's experiences during the occupation and thereby intervene in the predominantly masculine field of occupation scholarship. Defining the occupation as an instance of "women's liberation," however, the dominant focus in this new body of scholarship has been on the positive effects the occupiers allegedly brought to Japanese women. Susan Pharr's influential article, "The Politics of Women's Rights," is a prime example. She analyzes the policymaking processes in which American women occupiers formed &ldquoan alliance for liberation&rdquo with middle- and upper-class Japanese women leaders and pursued women&rsquos rights against patriarchal resistance from both Japanese and American men. According to Pharr, the occupation was &ldquothe world&rsquos most radical experiment with women&rsquos rights&rdquo that resulted in successful &ldquofeminist reform&rdquo: "The marriage of democracy and women's rights in the minds of most Occupation personnel heightened the significance of their contribution." 12 Such understanding of the occupation rarely questions the motives and intentions of American women occupiers and ignores racism, sexism, classism, and imperialism that informed these women&rsquos practices in occupied Japan.

To a surprising degree, Japanese scholars share Pharr's perspective. Citing Pharr, Uemura Chikako and other Japanese women scholars argue that the occupation's gender reform provides overwhelming evidence of the positive role that the United States, and especially its women occupiers, played for Japanese women. Even though U.S. gender interventions might not have been thorough or sufficient, the occupation was a positive event for Japanese women. It is important to note, however, that the studies by these Japanese women scholars are significantly more nuanced than Pharr's, generally mentioning the limitations inherent in any effort to instill "foreign" notions of "democracy" and "gender equality." Uemura, for example, points out that U.S. gender policies were based on a U.S. middle-class ideology, and thus were not as radical as they might at first appear. Japanese women scholars, aware of the reverse course, also acknowledge the less than democratic nature of occupation interventions. Yet these observations do not lead them to a more critical reevaluation of U.S. gender reforms per se, nor of the meanings and implications of such reforms within the context of the occupation or of Cold War imperialism. They rarely question what they perceive as the genuinely liberatory motives and intentions of American women occupiers (or, for that matter, those of Japanese women), and ignore racism, sexism, classism, and imperialism that informed these women's discourses and practices. 13 This reflects a larger pattern of analysis that has emerged following a &ldquowomen&rsquos studies turn&rdquo in studies of empire in the U.S. and Europe. As Jane Haggis points out, the feminist project of bringing women into historical analysis of empire has sustained and promoted, rather than challenged, Western hegemony as it has uncritically accepted Western women&rsquos claim for beneficent intentions in &ldquohelping&rdquo others and thereby reinterpreted imperialism as a feminized endeavor of education and civilization. 14

Significantly, former women occupiers have played a salient role in facilitating this &ldquowomen&rsquos studies turn&rdquo in occupation studies. Beginning with Susan Pharr&rsquos interview with Beate Sirota Gordon in the 1970s, scholars and media in Japan and the United States have sought participant accounts from women who served in the occupation. As a result, Gordon, an author of the gender equality articles in the postwar constitution, and Carmen Johnson, an officer in charge of grassroots democratization, have achieved a certain celebrity status as feminist mother-liberators of Japanese women. Not only have they become women scholars&rsquo favorite interview subjects their memoirs have been published first in Japanese and later in English documentaries depicting their efforts to emancipate Japanese women have been produced in Japan academic conferences and lectures both in the United States and Japan have provided forums for them to tell their occupation stories. According to their narratives, the occupation was a moment of women&rsquos liberation where Japanese women gained freedom, equality and democracy under the guidance of American women. Importantly, the exhilarating story of American women emancipating Japanese women is not simply a product of American bias. For instance, Gordon&rsquos 1997 English-language memoir, The Only Woman in the Room, which was first published in Japanese, resulted from her collaboration with Japanese filmmaker, Hiraoka Mariko. 15 Indeed, the project of documenting Gordon&rsquos story started with Hiraoka who directed an all-female film crew to create a documentary about Gordon&rsquos involvement in the constitutional revision. The success of the film led to the publication of her autobiography, in which Hiraoka again played an instrumental role as she interviewed Gordon and other individuals involved in the constitution revision, transcribed the interviews, and conducted archival research.

Clearly, many Japanese women &ndash Hiraoka and numerous others who embrace the story of their emancipation by foreign women &ndash share overlapping discursive spaces with their American counterparts, drawing on the same reservoir of ideas and assumptions about the occupation and its positive impacts on women. How do we explain Japanese and American women&rsquos collaboration in maintaining this understanding of the occupation? Crucially, the narrative of successful gender reform (dis)locates both women outside the purview of critical analysis of nation and empire. The narrative hinges on the long-standing Orientalist construction of Japanese women as helpless victims who, until the arrival of American women in 1945, had been incapable of autonomous action. The image of Japanese women as victims without agency conceals, indeed makes unimaginable, their willing participation in Japanese colonialism. The same narrative also relies on and reinforces the notion of progressive, emancipated, and thus &ldquosuperior&rdquo American women who selflessly pursued the emancipation of other, inferior women. Driven by good intentions, they initiated a remarkable, indeed revolutionary, feminist reform project. The congratulatory narrative of the occupation constructs both American and Japanese women as innocent bystanders to, rather than complicit participants in, the problematic politics of race, nation, and empire. That such women-centered accounts of the occupation were widely circulated in the last decades of the twentieth century, when the controversies involving Korean Comfort Women on the one hand, and the 1995 rape incident in Okinawa on the other, began to shed critical light on Japanese and American colonial pasts as embodied by colonized/minority women, indicates central and also contentious dynamics surrounding women and gender across the divides of race, nation, and empire in the Asia-Pacific region.

While recasting women in the occupation constitutes a necessary task, even more urgent is reexamining the occupation as a gendered and gendering political process. As Joan Scott argues in Gender and the Politics of History, taking gender as a category of analysis goes far beyond simply uncovering information about women. Scott defines gender as a socially constructed binary opposition between the meanings associated with masculine and those with feminine. Gender as a meaning system constitutes "a primary way of signifying relationships of power" or "a primary field within which or by means of which power is articulated," and "structure(s) perception and the concrete and symbolic organization of all social life." Thus incorporating gender as a category of analysis leads to a drastic shift in historical studies. As she points out, gender analysis

provides a way to decode meaning and to understand the complex connections among various forms of human interactions. When historians look for the ways in which the concept of gender legitimizes and constructs social relationships, they develop insight into the reciprocal nature of gender and society and into the particular and contextually specific ways in which politics constructs gender and gender constructs politics. 16

While I take seriously Scott's insight concerning gender as a centrally important category in historical analysis, I see the need to go beyond a study based on a single category of analysis. The recent important shifts in the feminist paradigm &ndash from excavating women's stories, to incorporating gender as a category of analysis, and finally to examining the intersectionality of multiple categories of race, gender, class, sexuality, and so on &ndash have placed studies of history on new terrain.

Among numerous studies that examine multiple and intersecting vectors of power, Anne McClintock's study, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Context, is particularly useful for the analysis of the U.S. occupation of Japan, as she delineates the intricate and often convoluted workings of gender and power in imperial and colonial settings. McClintock points out that gender is always articulated in relation to other vectors of power, and insists on the importance of an analytical paradigm that takes into account more than one category, cautioning against "narratives that orient power around a single, originary scene":

Race, gender and class are not distinct realms of experience, existing in splendid isolation from each other nor can they be simply yoked together retrospectively like armatures of Lego. Rather, they come into existence in and through relation to each other &ndash if in contradictory and conflictual ways. In this sense, gender, race and class can be called articulated categories.

As she emphasizes, race, gender, class, and so on are not "reducible to, or identical, with each other instead, they exist in intimate, reciprocal and contradictory relations." What she refers to as "a fantastic conflation of the themes of gender, race and class" is a distinctive feature of both Western colonialism and the U.S. occupation of Japan. 17

Applied to the U.S. occupation of Japan, the analytical approach suggested by McClintock not only casts new light on American and Japanese women's discourses and practices during the occupation it also leads to the observation that the occupation was an extraordinarily dynamic political process simultaneously animated by gender, race, class, and sexual dynamics. A multivector analysis of the occupation and its gender reform provides a unique analytical framework that leads to different interpretations of a given event that often oppose those exclusively focused on race, gender, or class. The significance of this approach is pointed out by Dorinne Kondo, who succinctly argues that analysis that pays attention to a single category of power "forecloses the possibility of ruptures and interventions when other forces are considered." 18 Indeed, the heterogeneous &ndash and often disruptive, contradictory, and uneven &ndash nature of the occupation and its gender reform can only be illuminated by attending to the intersection of multiple strands of power that sometimes work with, but other times against, each other. A multivector analysis of power allows us to examine, for example, how the occupiers' gender reform as an apparatus of domination was made all the more powerful as it was energized by the convergence of race, gender, and class dynamics. Gender reform relied on and reinscribed the racialized imperial notions of American superiority and Japanese inferiority on the one hand, and on the other recruited Japanese middle-class women as a tool of class containment, that is, as conservative, anticommunist allies in the midst of increasingly volatile labor mobilization. Yet, gender, race, and class dynamics did not always so neatly line up. Gender reform also caused instability and incoherence in the occupation, as Japanese middle- and working-class women forged a cross-class alliance in critiquing the "undemocratic" treatment of Japanese women in the occupiers' approach to venereal disease control and reasserted their racial, sexual, and national respectability. A feminist analysis informed by McClintock's and Kondo's insights thus sheds light on the ubiquitous nature of hegemony, but equally or more problematically, allows us to recognize hegemony's inability to hold itself together, or its constant "leakage," in U.S.-occupied Japan.

Feminist Colonial and Postcolonial Studies

The centrality of women and gender in the politics of empire has been emphasized by feminist colonial and postcolonial scholars in recent years. In Western colonial processes, the colonizers often analogized relations between colonizers and colonized to a male-female sexual encounter, in which Africa, the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific were imagined feminine, colored, and sexualized bodies, while European and American colonizing forces were white and masculine, invading, exploring, and conquering &ldquovirgin lands.&rdquo Furthermore, in colonial imagination, native women were frequently constructed as helpless victims under indigenous patriarchal domination, indicating the uncivilized and racially inferior condition of colonized societies in contrast to the gender progressive, and as such, civilized and racially superior, condition of colonizers&rsquo societies. 19 Such construction of native women did not remain rhetoric, but frequently led to interventions in the name of &ldquocivilizing&rdquo native women and indigenous gender relations. Notwithstanding the colonizers' seemingly benign intentions, such reform process turned indigenous women into an important &ldquoentry point&rdquo for the Western civilizing project whose objective was tantamount to socializing indigenous women with Western values to create obedient and loyal colonial subjects. Gendered and racialized acculturation projects were further informed by class dynamics, as they often focused on schooling indigenous elite women. Following such reeducation, Western values would &ldquofilter downward&rdquo to the rest of the indigenous population, destructing the indigenous power structure.

American women, including feminists, actively participated in these gendered and racialized dynamics of empire building. Studies by scholars such as Jane Hunter, Ian Tyrrell, Leila Rupp, and Tracey Jean Boisseau have persuasively shown that American women&rsquos articulations of &ldquowomen&rsquos emancipation&rdquo &ndash their own as well as other women&rsquos &ndash were inseparable from the process of nation and empire building. 20 With ideologies and practices underpinned by a &ldquofeminist&rdquo critique of male domination at home and an endorsement of an &ldquointernational sisterhood&rdquo among Western and non-Western women, American women missionaries, moral reformers, and suffragists were often critical of U.S. imperial expansionism. Nevertheless, they often uncritically accepted and disseminated the notions of racially inferior, uncivilized, and oppressed non-Western women and civilized and emancipated Western women who were to save women of color. Driven by a feminist intention of emancipating other women, Western women&rsquos feminist reform work provided a critical means for U.S. imperial expansion abroad, lending force and justification to its pursuit of hegemony.

In Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices, Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan explore the intimate &ndash and problematic &ndash relation between feminism and imperialism:

Our critique of certain forms of feminism emerge from their willing participation in modernity with all its colonial discourses and hegemonic First World formations that wittingly or unwittingly lead to the oppression and exploitation of many women. In supporting the agenda of modernity, therefore, feminists misrecognize and fail to resist Western hegemonies. 21

Their observations about feminism&rsquos &ldquoimbrication&rdquo with modernity and its related institutions, such as colonialism, racism, and nationalism, provide a crucial insight for analysis of Western feminist formation and its relation to other women. The question we need to ask is no longer whether Western feminists were imperialists or anti-imperialists. Rather we need to investigate when and how feminist discourses and practices inform and are in turn informed by politics of nation and empire.

In Home and Harem: Nation, Gender, Empire, and the Cultures of Travel, which examines British and Indian feminist formations, Inderpal Grewal offers analytical insights that are applicable to instances beyond British imperialism and that put not only Western but also non-Western feminist formations under critical scrutiny:

[M]any forms of feminisms existed through participating in certain dominant discourses so that the issue, then, is not a search for a transparent or transcendent feminism but a need to examine the conditions of possibility of these feminisms&hellipRather than debate feminism&rsquos collusions or resistance, I argue that nationalism, imperialism, and colonial discourse shaped the contexts in which feminist subjects became possible in both England and India.&rdquo

Recognizing imperialism as an enabling condition &ndash a condition that &ldquoprovided possibilities and problematic&rdquo for feminism &ndash is crucial. 22 Moreover, by showing colonized (in this instance, Indian) women&rsquos feminist formation as equally, although differently, embedded in modernity, nationalism, and imperialism, Grewal challenges binary, oppositional notions of dominant and oppressed, or colonized and colonized.

The US occupation of Japan and its gender reform shed light on the important connections among women, gender, feminism, and empire: the American masculine gaze toward Japanese women, indeed toward the Japanese nation as a whole constructions of Japan as feudal, patriarchal, and thus racially inferior, in contrast to the modern, gender progressive, and thus racially superior United States the centrality of Japanese women&rsquos reform as an American civilizing and modernizing project mobilization of Japanese elite women as a point of &ldquoinfiltration&rdquo in the project of postwar Americanization of Japan and finally, American women&rsquos feminist discourses and practices concerning Japanese women&rsquos &ldquoemancipation&rdquo which were inseparable from gendered colonial understandings of emancipated American women and victimized Japanese women who were in need of guidance and rescue. In American gender reform in postwar Japan, feminist emancipatory rhetoric and practices were never outside, but rather at the center, of postwar American imperial expansionism.

Despite these similarities between the U.S. occupation of Japan and other instances of imperial endeavors, it is also important to analyze the distinct feature of postwar U.S. imperialism in Japan. Importantly, U.S. imperialism in the case of the occupation was significantly shaped by the nature of Japan itself. What Tani Barlow calls Japan&rsquos &ldquodouble relation&rdquo to colonialism &ndash Japan&rsquos own development as a colonial power in Asia since the late nineteenth century within the context of Western imperial and colonial domination &ndash complexly shaped the postwar U.S. occupation of Japan. While contending with Western colonial domination, Japan pursued its own imperial project by colonizing neighboring nations in the name of creating the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 23 Japanese modern feminism emerged out of this context, sharing intimate and problematic ties with Japan&rsquos nationalist and colonial dynamics. Despite its unconditional surrender and enormous reduction in territory at the end of World War II, many aspects of Japanese colonialism, including its gendered nationalist politics, survived after the summer of 1945. As John Dower documents in Embracing Defeat, the existing Japanese ruling sector tenaciously negotiated with and even covertly resisted the U.S. authorities. Since the U.S. needed to remake Japan into its ally in the emerging Cold War context, MacArthur often compromised and even collaborated with the existing elites, which led not only to a retention of the Imperial Household but also to the emergence of a conservative, pro-American regime in postwar Japan. This led to, among others, the Japanese rearticulation during the occupation of its own hegemonic nationalist and imperial discourses concerning women, race, family, and nation. Japanese middle- and upper-class women leaders who were empowered under the guidance of American women occupiers participated in these political dynamics and reasserted their racial and national respectability, which in turn contributed to marginalization of those historically dispossessed in Japan&rsquos colonial modernity, i.e., poor, working-class women as well as colonized and minoritized women.

Cold War Cultural Studies

Finally, in examining the U.S. occupation of Japan as a case of imperialism, it is important to attend to its specific context, i.e., the Cold War. As well documented by scholars on Cold War culture such as Elaine Tyler May, Alan Nadel, Laura McEnaney, Guy Oaks, Christina Klein, and Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann, among others, Cold War culture spawned several distinct political discourses and practices which were deeply informed by gender. 24

Elaine Tyler May&rsquos study traces how the Cold War produced &ldquocontainment culture&rdquo which was &ldquomore than the internal reverberations of foreign policy, and went beyond the explicit manifestations of anticommunist hysteria such as McCarthyism and the &lsquoRed Scare&rsquo&rdquo to involve women and domesticity as the central sites of its articulations. 25 To understand the significance of gender in containment culture, it is by now almost customary to cite the 1959 &ldquokitchen debate&rdquo between Richard Nixon, then the vice president of the United States, and Nikita Khrushchev, the premier of the Soviet Union. At the site of the American National Exhibition in Moscow, Nixon emphatically argued that the American suburban home, equipped with modern household appliances, such as a &ldquobuilt-in panel-controlled washing machine,&rdquo allowed women to perform household labor more efficiently and thus to enjoy &ldquofreedom&rdquo and a good life. American women owed this to capitalism, free market enterprise, and the abundance of consumer good. All of this, Nixon insisted, demonstrated the clear superiority of American capitalism to communism. Khrushchev flatly disagreed. He pointed to Soviet women workers as evidence of the superiority of communism. Under the communist system, he argued, women were free of &ldquocapitalist&rdquo assumptions about gender roles and participated in productive activities. The debate gave new meaning and status to domesticity, endowing it with political significance specific to the Cold War era. 26 The importance of American domesticity &ndash of American kitchens, fashions, supermarkets, hairstyles, and cosmetics &ndash in Cold War politics was not limited to this instance. 27 As Robert Haddow documents, &ldquoexhibiting American culture abroad&rdquo constituted a salient U.S. Cold War strategy, and things associated with American domesticity, such as kitchen gadgets, played critical roles in selling the desirability of American democracy and containing the proliferation of communism in the &ldquofree world.&rdquo 28 As Igarashi Yoshikuni documents, occupied Japan was one of the sites where such gendered containment strategy flourished: the occupiers&rsquo gender reform utilized radio programs, films, exhibits at department stores, and so on to introduce American domesticity as the marker of superiority and desirability of the American way of life and to mobilize Japanese women as allies in the Cold War. 29

That domesticity came to possess new political significance in the Cold War is observed in other instances as well. As evidenced in the civil defense programs in the U.S., preparing for and defending the nation against Soviet nuclear attacks became a gendered project. The Federal Civil Defense Administration initiated the nation-wide campaign of &ldquoGrandma&rsquos Pantry&rdquo which defined the home bomb shelter and its orderly maintenance by women as a chief means to securing families&rsquo and nation&rsquos survival in the event of nuclear holocaust. &ldquoNuclear readiness&rdquo was equated with readiness at home, with women at the center of this domestic containment project. By &ldquoinfus(ing) the traditional role of women with new meaning and importance,&rdquo Cold War culture helped &ldquofortify the home as a place of security amid the cold war,&rdquo generating the postwar cult of domesticity where the white middle-class heterosexual marriage and family became a source of personal and national security, a symbol of (American) democracy and freedom, and a bulwark against the danger of communist infiltration. 30

The civil defense programs also urged Americans to master skills and procedures through repeated practices in preparation for nuclear war. As exemplified in the drill exercise of &ldquoduck and cover,&rdquo the civil defense programs &ldquoidentify the procedures essential to survival and teach the American people how to perform them,&rdquo with the understanding that &ldquoa set of rules, if correctly followed, would produce the desired results.&rdquo 31 The acquisition of techniques and procedures had moral and ethical implications: civil defense was a means to build a national ethic, solidify morale, and ensure the survival of the American way of life. 32

Postwar Japan became a highly charged theater for emerging Cold War culture, where containment discourses and practices, including mastery of skills and techniques through repeated exercises, became disseminated as the central component of gender reform. Not only was the American middle-class heterosexual family presented as the model of &ldquogender equality&rdquo which Japanese women were to emulate. In reeducating and democratizing Japanese women, American women occupiers utilized numerous skits and role playing, and at training sessions, Japanese women were required, quite literally, to play a part, practicing their roles until their performance became flawless, proof that Japanese women were &ldquorehabilitated&rdquo and &ldquoreoriented.&rdquo Through repetition, American women occupiers, and many Japanese women, came to believe in the veracity of American democratization of Japan and the desirability of the American way of life. In order to &ldquodemocratize&rdquo Japanese women, Carmen Johnson devised skits and drill exercises based on the materials found in &ldquoTechniques of Democracy: A Guide to Procedure for Japanese Organization,&rdquo the pamphlet that specified the basic procedures for running an organization such as voting and making motions. In other instance, Japanese women were required to engage in role playing that depicted American-style heterosexual marital relations as a way of learning the meanings of &ldquodemocracy&rdquo and &ldquogender equality.&rdquo Thus, occupied Japan became a highly charged theater for emerging Cold War culture. It was not simply that Cold War culture was being exported to and imposed on Japan. It would be more appropriate to argue that despite its geographical distance from the U.S. continent, Japan became a salient site for the articulation of Cold War culture, with a remarkable degree of willingness on the part of many Japanese women to participate in its performance. The occupiers&rsquo gender reform constituted one exemplary locus of gendered containment culture.

Despite its ubiquitous nature, Cold War containment culture was also fraught with ambivalence and anxieties. Extolling the virtue of traditional wives and mothers as the source of national security, containment culture stigmatized (and feared) those who fell outside of traditional heterosexual domesticity &ndash not only &ldquofailed&rdquo wives and mothers but also leftist women, prostitutes, and homosexuals, among others &ndash as the source of threats and even subversion. Women&rsquos sexuality was at the heart of the problem, as seen in the proliferation of sexual symbolism in the Cold War U.S. The notion of a sexy woman as a &ldquobomb shell,&rdquo &ldquoknockout,&rdquo or &ldquodynamite&rdquo emerged, and a new design of women&rsquos swimwear, the &ldquobikini,&rdquo appeared four days after the dropping of the hydrogen bomb on the Bikini Islands. In one of the civil defense brochures, the image of women striking a seductive pose in bathing suits personified atomic radiation, articulating &ldquothe symbolic connections between the fears of atomic power, sex, and women out of control.&rdquo 33 A Harvard physician predicted that an atomic explosion would result in the breakdown of familial-sexual order, leading to rampant promiscuity and a &ldquo1,000 percent increase in venereal disease.&rdquo 34 Moral-sexual anxieties were inseparable from anxieties about communism, and thus &ldquo[f]rom the Senate to the FBI, from the anticommunists in Hollywood to Mickey Spillane, moral weakness was associated with sexual degeneracy, which allegedly led to communism.&rdquo 35

In occupied Japan, Cold War sexual politics produced a number of ambivalent and often ironic dynamics. By relegating the task of gender reform to women, the occupation authorities inadvertently created a &ldquowomen-only&rdquo sphere consisting of American women reformers and Japanese middle- and upper-class women leaders. While these women were ardent promoters of containment politics, they also developed close working relationships, and on some occasions even extremely strong and passionate bonds, with each other, which led MacArthur and other male occupiers to caution against the formation of a &ldquowomen&rsquos bloc.&rdquo While this is often interpreted as a sign of American male occupiers&rsquo reluctance in promoting genuine gender equality, reexamined within the context of Cold War containment culture, their reluctance could be read differently, possibly as an expression of ambivalence toward female-to-female homosocial bonding. 36 Sexuality became a source of disturbance in another way as well. Fraternization between American soldiers and Japanese women, and the resulting widespread venereal disease infection, caused a whole new set of sexual controversies. Far from being compliant subjects of the occupation, Japanese women proved to be a source of &ldquocontamination,&rdquo indeed &ldquomenace.&rdquo Unruly and uncontainable, Japanese women&rsquos sexuality was endangering the very success of the occupation. Equally or more problematic, venereal disease was considered a sign of American soldiers&rsquo moral, spiritual, and physical degeneration, whose lack of self discipline was jeopardizing the U.S. mission of defending democracy in postwar Japan. 37

The dynamics described above challenge and complicate earlier analyses of the occupation. Recent work by scholars such as Naoko Shibusawa, Caroline Chung Simpson, Michael Molasky, and Yuki Tanaka, among others, apply gender as a category of analysis for examining postwar U.S.-Japanese encounters, i.e., the U.S. as a dominant, masculine figure with a mission to rescue and subordinate a feminized Japan. As they argue, fraternization between American soldiers and Japanese women constitutes a concrete manifestation of hierarchical, gendered, and sexualized dynamics between the victor/occupier and the defeated/occupied. 38 However, insights drawn from Cold War cultural studies point to a need for far more complex analysis of gender and sexuality in U.S.-Japan relations. The crisis of American masculinity represented by venereal disease and unruly and uncontainable sexuality of Japanese women indicate the precariousness of the notion of America as masculine and powerful and Japan as feminine and docile. The emergence of female-to-female bonds in the course of gender reform further challenges and complicates the argument that the occupation be read exclusively as a heterosexual narrative of white men dominating subjugated and docile women of color. Stepping into a postwar imperial project primarily defined in heterosexual and masculinist terms, American and Japanese women shifted, rather than simply replicated, these terms. A reform network consisting of American and Japanese women introduced a narrative of female-to-female homosociality into a Cold War project predicated on the erasure of any sign of sexual transgression. The current, almost exclusive emphasis on masculinization of America and feminization of Japan in gender analysis of U.S.-Japan relations falsely constructs Japan and its women as subjugated and without agency, and thus inadvertently reproduces the dominant orders of gender, sexuality, and nation without due attention to numerous examples of resistance, subversion, and contradictions that occurred during the occupation. 39

Reinterpreting the meanings and consequences of the occupation from a critical feminist perspective generates a multidisciplinary dialogue among occupation studies, Cold War cultural studies, and postcolonial feminist studies where assumptions of each discipline are challenged and even altered. Occupation studies have long neglected the centrality of gender (as distinguished from &ldquowomen&rdquo), and as a result, failed to understand the occupation as a deeply gendered project where American and Japanese women played centrally important roles in postwar U.S.&ndashJapan negotiations. Insights from Cold War cultural studies and postcolonial feminist studies would lead occupation scholars to reexamine Japanese women as active and complicit participants in containment politics and to reinterpret the occupation&rsquos gender reform as a complex instance of Cold War mobilization of women where Japanese and American racism, nationalism, and imperialism converged to enable a deeply problematic form of feminism.

Cold War cultural studies has conventionally focused on domestic dynamics but not fully investigated the ways in which containment culture was also articulated abroad, with significant involvement of non-American and nonwhite others. The occupation&rsquos gender reform suggests that the international feminist movement constituted a significant site of Cold War cultural formation where American and Japanese women played active roles in simultaneously bolstering and subverting the emerging orders of gender, race, sexuality, and nation. To gain a fuller understanding of the Cold War, it is necessary for scholars to cast their gaze beyond the national domestic context and examine transnational space, especially international feminist discourses and practices, as yet another site of historical and analytical significance, with critical attention to a multitude of tensions, dissonance, and incoherence in containment culture.

Postcolonial feminist studies has been generating increasingly critical and sophisticated understandings of Western feminism. Understanding Western feminism as deeply implicated in racism, nationalism, and imperialism leads to examination of &ldquothe conditions of possibility&rdquo that contributed to feminist formations. In the case of the U.S. occupation of Japan, American and Japanese women&rsquos articulations of postwar feminism were enabled by and in turn enabled Cold War racism, nationalism, and imperialism, facilitating American (re)assertion for racial and national superiority and contributing to its pursuit of postwar global hegemony. Clearly the occupation&rsquos gender reform was at one level an instance of Western imperial feminism where the politics of &ldquowomen&rsquos emancipation&rdquo reinscribed and reinforced the conventional hierarchy between a West and non-Western other. At the same time, the complex nature of the U.S.&ndashJapan encounter requires a far more nuanced and multifaceted analysis. Far from powerless victims under U.S. domination, Japanese women engaged in a series of resistance, complicity, and subversion, not only challenging hegemonic orders imposed by the occupiers, but also appropriating them to reassert Japan&rsquos racial and national superiority and to articulate their own version of postwar imperial feminism that was no less problematic than that of the Americans. The stories of American gender reform in Japan challenge the binary, oppositional notions of West and non-West, dominant and oppressed, or colonizers and colonized, and urge feminist scholars to critically reexamine the meanings and consequences of non-Western women&rsquos agency within the politics of race, nation, and empire.

Finally, critical examination of the U.S. occupation of Japan and its gender reform sheds light on American and Japanese postwar national memories and reveals a number of erasures, or incidents of historical amnesia, that have been enabled by the myth of American emancipation of Japanese women. The narrative of the occupation as successful emancipation and democratization of oppressed and subjugated people, especially women, has enabled America&rsquos self-understanding as the legitimate global leader in the post&ndashWorld War II world, and has obscured the historical reality that the occupation was part of American pursuit of Cold War hegemony that entailed domestic and international violence and oppressions. The occupation narrative has played an equally or even more problematic role in Japan&rsquos postwar self-understanding. Not only has the myth of Japan&rsquos rebirth as a democratic and peaceful nation under MacArthur concealed the nation&rsquos colonial past filled with violence and atrocities the narrative crucially depends on and sustains the understanding of Japanese women as helpless victims: Until the arrival of American women in 1945, Japanese women had been incapable of any action. This notion of Japanese women as victims without agency has erased from the nation&rsquos historical consciousness the problematic roles women played in prewar Japanese racism and imperialism in Asia. The two nations&rsquo continuing investment in the narratives of women&rsquos emancipation during the occupation thus needs to be interrogated and replaced by more critical understandings of women, nation, and empire in twentieth-century U.S.&ndashJapan relations.

Mire Koikari is Associate Professor and Director of Women&rsquos Studies, University of Hawai&rsquoi. Her research and teaching center on re-examining European, American, and Japanese feminisms from critical perspectives involving race, nation, and empire. The present article draws on and develops material from her book, Pedagogy of Democracy: Feminism and the Cold War in the U.S. Occupation of Japan.

Recommended citation: Mire Koikari, Feminism and the Cold War in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, 1945 &ndash 1952, The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 7 No 1, February 14, 2011.

1 Douglas MacArthur, &ldquoA Fourth of July Message,&rdquo Life, vol. 23, no. 1 (1947), 34. There are a number of excellent studies that examine U.S. colonization of the Philippines from critical gendered perspectives. See, for example, Vicente Rafael, White Love and Other Events in Filipino History (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000) and Kristin Hoganson, Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippines-American Wars (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). U.S. colonization of the Philippines was invoked as a showcase of America's benign and beneficent rule in subsequent U.S. interventions abroad. See, for example, Mark Bradley, "Slouching toward Bethlehem: Culture, Diplomacy, and the Origins of the Cold War in Vietnam," in Christian Appy, ed., Cold War Constructions: The Political Culture of United States Imperialism, 1945 &ndash 1966, (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).

2 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), 305.

3 Obituary, &ldquoEarnest Hoberecht, Popular Novelist in Occupied Japan, is Dead at 81,&rdquo New York Times, September 26, 1999.

4 Raymond Higgins, From Hiroshima with Love: The Allied Military Governor&rsquos Remarkable Story of the Rebuilding of Japan&rsquos Business and Industry After WWII (Phoenix, Arizona: VIA Press, 1995).

5 For one of the earliest discussions of "imperial feminism," see Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmer, "Challenging Imperial Feminism," Feminist Review no. 17, July 1984. For a review of subsequent scholarship on imperial feminism in the U.S. and Europe, see my discussion of feminist colonial and postcolonial studies below.

6 For discussions on Japanese women's complicity in prewar and wartime nationalism and imperialism, see, for example, Suzuki Yūko, Feminizumu to sensō: fujin undōka no sensō kyōryoku (Tokyo: Marujusha, 1988).

7 For earlier reviews of occupation scholarship, see John Dower, &ldquoOccupied Japan as History and Occupation History as Politics,&rdquo Journal of Asian Studies 34, no. 2 (1975), and Carol Gluck, &ldquoEntangling Illusions &ndash Japanese and American Views of the Occupation,&rdquo in Warren Cohen, ed., New Frontiers in America &ndashEast Asia Relations, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

8 John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton and Company/The New Press, 1999) Yukiko Koshiro, Transpacific Racisms and the U.S. Occupation of Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

9 Dower, War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 10. For another important study that provides a history of American constructions of "Orient" and "Orientals" (Asian Americans as well as Asians) within the context of Western colonial racism and culture, see Robert Lee, Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1999).

10 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 211.

11 Koshiro, Transpacific Racisms, 16. In this study, Koshiro sheds important light on the genealogy of racism in the United States. As she documents, despite a shift in American academic discourse of race that moved away from the notion of physical and biological superiority versus inferiority based on skin color to one of cultural and sociological differences and diversities in the 1940s, the physical and biological notion of race persisted. While the American authorities increasingly adopted cultural and sociological discourse of race to facilitate alliance making with Japan, the notion of physical and biological racial differences continued at the grassroots level, informing everyday U.S.-Japan encounters in covert and overt ways.

12 Susan Pharr, &ldquoThe Politics of Women&rsquos Rights&rdquo in Robert Ward and Yoshikazu Sakamoto, eds., Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 222 &ndash 223, 248.

13 Uemura Chikako, Josei kaihō o meguru senryō seisaku (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2007). Though published in 2007, the book is based on a series of articles Uemura published in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For studies that characterize the occupation as positive for Japanese women with personal accounts of Japanese women who were involved in gender reform, see Nishi Kiyoko, ed., Senryōka no Nihon fujin seisaku: Sono rekishi to shōgen (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 1985), and Sakai Harumi, &ldquoGHQ de hataraita joseitachi,&rdquo Joseigaku Kenkyū no.3 (1994). For a study that focuses on constitutional revision as the foundation of Japanese women&rsquos liberation, see Kyōko Inoue, MacArthur&rsquos Japanese Constitution: A Linguistic and Cultural Studies of Its Making (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). Recent scholarship on the occupation has begun to offer far more nuanced and critical accounts of American gender reform and its consequences for Japanese women. For a study that examines occupation-time labor policies targeting women, see Toyoda Maho, Senryōka no josei rōdō kaikaku (Tokyo: Keisō Shobō, 2007). For a study that examines occupation-era education policies targeting women, see Tsuchiya Yuka, Shinbei Nihon no kōchiku: Amerika no tainichi jōhō, kyōiku seisaku to Nihon senryō (Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2009).

14 Jane Haggis, "Gendering Colonialism and Colonising Gender? Recent Women's Studies Approaches to White Women and the History of British Colonialism," Women's Studies International Forum 13:1/2 (1990).

15 Beate Sirota Gordon, The Only Woman in the Room, A Memoir (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1997).

16 Joan Scott, Gender and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 44 &ndash 46.

17 Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest (New York: Routledge, 1995), 4 &ndash 5.

18 Dorinne Kondo, About Face: Performing Race in Fashion and Theater (New York: Routledge, 1997), 149.

19 As Chandra Mohanty succinctly points out in her discussions on women, imperial politics, and production of knowledge, such imperial feminist discourses continue to inform Western feminist scholars&rsquo analysis and result in binary understandings of emancipated and autonomous Western women and oppressed and victimized non-Western women. Chandra Mohanty, &ldquoUnder Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses,&rdquo in Chandra Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds., Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991).

20 Jane Hunter, The Gospel of Gentility: American Women Missionaries in Turn of the Century China (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) Ian Tyrrell, Woman&rsquos World, Woman&rsquos Empire: The Woman&rsquos Christian Temperance Union in International Perspective, 1880 &ndash 1930 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991) Leila Rupp, Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women&rsquos Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) Tracey Jean Boisseau, White Queen: May French-Sheldon and the Imperial Origins of American Feminist Identity (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

21 Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan, eds., Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 2.

22 Inderpal Grewal, Home and Harem: Nation, Gender, Empire, and the Cultures of Travel (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996), 11 &ndash 12.

23 Tani Barlow, &ldquoIntroduction: On &lsquoColonial Modernity&rsquo&rdquo in Tani Barlow, ed., Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997), 10.

24 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War (New York: Basic Books, 1999) Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995) Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) Guy Oaks, The Imaginary War: Civil Defense and American Cold War Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) Christina Klein, Cold War Orienatlism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945 &ndash 1961 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003) Ruth Oldenziel and Karin Zachmann, eds., Cold War Kitchen: Americanization, Technology, and European Users (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2009).

25 May, Homeward Bound, xxi.

27 Nor was the significance of domesticity in imperial expansionism limited to the Cold War era. For discussions of domesticity as a site of racial conquest and national-imperial expansionism in the mid-nineteenth century, see Amy Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002), especially Chapter 1 "Manifest Domesticity." For the continuing significance of domesticity in American imperial expansionism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, see Rafael, White Love, especially Chapter 2 "Colonial Domesticity: Engendering Race at the Edge of Empire, 1899 &ndash 1912."

28 Robert Haddow, Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997), especially see Chapter 6 "Men's Gadgets, Women's Fashions, and the American Way of Life."

29 Yoshikuni Igarashi, Bodies of Memory: Narratives of War in Postwar Japanese Culture, 1945 &ndash 1970 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 78.

30 May, Homeward Bound, 90 &ndash 93.

31 Oaks, The Imaginary War, 80.

32 Examining Cold War U.S. culture where containment narratives were repeatedly articulated at various sites, Alan Nadel argues that such &ldquorepetition of tropes&hellipfacilitates narratives that by virtue of their repetition seem &lsquonatural,&rsquo like clichés, and like 'common sense,' refer to what everyone &lsquoknows&rsquo is true.&rdquo In the context of the Cold War where much remained unknown and unknowable and fears, anxieties, and ambivalence prevailed, &ldquothe rampant performance of narratives, in such a variety of sites and forms&rdquo helped &ldquocreate the illusion that national narratives were knowable and unquestionable realities,&rdquo thus facilitating successful mobilization of the American public to the Cold War. See Nadel, Containment Culture, 8. For a documentary film that illuminates the significance of repetition as a sense-making practice in the Cold War U.S., see Kevin Rafferty, Jayne Loader, and Pierce Rafferty, &ldquoThe Atomic Café&rdquo (New York: Docudrama, 2008).

33 May, Homeward Bound, 96 &ndash 98.

36 For studies that examine sexual containment as a central theme of Cold War culture, see Geoffrey Smith, &ldquoNational Security and Personal Isolation: Sex, Gender and Disease in the Cold War United States,&rdquo The International History Review 14, no.1 (1992) David Harley Serlin, &ldquoChristine Jorgensen and the Cold War Closet,&rdquo Radical History Review 62 (1995) Allan Berube, Coming Out Under Fire: The History of Gay Men and Women in World War Two (New York: Free Express, 1990) John D&rsquoEmilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940 &ndash 1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). As Gayle Rubin argues, sexuality has its own institutional dynamics and hierarchy: the normative sexuality is heterosexual, marital, monogamous, and reproductive, and noncommercial, while other sexual activities and identities are defined as &ldquobad,&rdquo &ldquoabnormal,&rdquo or even &ldquounnatural.&rdquo These other forms of sexuality are further assigned hierarchical evaluations. Gayle Rubin, &ldquoThinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality,&rdquo in Carole Vance, ed., Pleasure Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality (London: Pandra Press, 1989), 280 &ndash 281. During the Cold War, not only homosexuality but also various other expressions of intimacy which fell outside the normative notion of sexuality came under intense social surveillance.

U.S. Occupation of Japan - HISTORY

Printed 1961
Revised 1962
Reprinted 1969

Historical Branch, G-3 Division
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Washington, D.C. 20380

Yokosuka Occupation
Marine Corps Landings: 30-31 August 1945


The United States Marines in the Occupation of Japan is a concise narrative of the major events which took place when Marine air and ground units were deployed to the main islands of Japan at the close of World War II. The text is based on official records, interviews with participants in the operations described, and reliable secondary sources. The pamphlet is published for the information of Marines and others interested in this significant period of Marine Corps history.

R.G. Owens, Jr.
Major General, U.S. marine Corps
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Reviewed and approved: 12 February 1969

The United States Marines in the Occupation of Japan

Henry I. Shaw, Jr.

The war was over, but the victory was not yet secure. Foremost among the multitude of new and pressing problems confronting Allied planners was the question of how the Japanese military would react to the sudden peace. On bypassed islands throughout the Pacific, on the mainland of Asia, and in Japan itself, over four million fighting men were still armed and organized for combat. Would all these men, who had proven themselves to be bitter-end, fanatical enemies even when faced with certain destruction, accept their Emperor's order to lay down their weapons? Or would some of them fight on, refusing to accept or believe the decision of their government? Would the tradition of fealty to the wishes of the Emperor overbalance years of conditioning that held surrender to be a crushing personal and national disgrace?

Logically, the focal point of Japanese physical and moral strength was the seat of Imperial rule. If Tokyo were occupied without incident, the chances for a successful and bloodless occupation of Japan and the peaceful surrender of outlying garrisons would be greatly enhanced. Plans for seizure of ports of entry in the Tokyo Bay area for occupation forces received top priority. Speed was essential and the spearhead troops of the occupying forces were selected form those with high combat readiness.

General MacArthur's command contributed the 11th Airborne Division to stage from Luzon through Okinawa to an airfield outside Tokyo. Admiral Nimitz ordered the Third Fleet, cruising the waters off Japan, to form a landing force from ships' complements to seize Yokosuka Naval Base in Tokyo Bay. to augment this naval force, the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac) was directed to provide a regimental combat team (RCT) for immediate occupation duty. These Marines, and others that followed them, were destined to play an important part in the occupation of Japan.

The Yokosuka Operation 1

prepared and distributed at army and fleet level for planning purposes. In early summer of 1945, as fighting raged on Okinawa and in the Philippines, dual planning went forward for both the assault on Japan (O LYMPIC and C ORONET ) and the occupation operation (B LACKLIST ).

Many essential elements of the two plans were similar and the Sixth Army, which was slated to make the attack on Kyushu under O LMPIC , was given the contingent task of occupying southern Japan under B LACKLIST . 2 In like manner, the Eighth Army, utilizing the wealth of information it had accumulated regardeing Honshu in planning C ORONET , was designated the occupying force for northern Japan. The Tenth Army, also scheduled for the Honshu assault by C ORONET , was given the mission of occupying Korea in B LACKLIST plans. 3

When the Japanese government made its momentous decision in the wake of atomikc bombings and Russia's entry into the war, the "only mililtary unit at hand with sufficient power to take Japan into custody at short notice and enforce the Allies' will until occupation troops arrived" 4 was Admiral William F. Halsey's Third Fleet, at sea off the enemy coast. Advance copies of Halsey's Operation Plan 10-45 for the occupation of Japan setting up Task Force 31 (TF 31), the Yokosuka Occupation Force, were distributed on 8 August. Two days later, Rear Admiral Oscar C. Badger (Commander, Battleship Division 7) was designated Commander, TF 31, and all ships were alerted to organize and equip bluejacket and Marine landing forces. At the same time, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, directed the 6th Marine Division to furnish an RCT to the Third Fleet for possible early occupation duty in Japan. 5 Brigadier General William T. Clement, Assistant Division Commander, was named to head the Fleet Landing Force.

Preliminary plans for the activation of Task Force Able, consisting of a skeletal headquarters detachment, the 4th Marines, Reinforced, and amphibian tractor company, and a medical company, were prepared by III Amphibious Corps in 11 August. Concurrently, officers designated to form General Clement's staff were alerted and immediately began planning to load out the task force. Warning orders were passed to the staff directing that the RCT with attached units be ready to embark within 48 hours.

The curtain of secrecy surrounding the proposed operation was lifted at 0900 on 12 August so that task force units could deal directly with the necessary service and supply agencies without processing their requests through the corps staff. All elements of the task force were completely re-outfitted, and the 5th Field Service Depot and receiving units went on a 24-hour work day to complete the resupply task. The 4th Marines joined 600 replacements from the FMFPac Transient Center, Marianas, to fill the gaps in its ranks left by combat attrition and stateside rotation.

Dump areas and dock space were allotted by the Island Command to accommodate the five transports, a cargo ship, and a dock landing ship of Transport Division 60 assigned to transport Task Force Able. The mounting-out process was considerably aided by the announcement that all ships would arrive in port on 14 August, 24 hours later than they were originally scheduled. On the evening of the 14th, however, "all loading plans for supplies were thrown into chaos" 6 by news of the substitution of a smaller class transport for one of those of the original group. The resultant reduction of shipping space was partially made up by the assignment of a landing ship, tank (LST) to the transport force. Later, after the task force had departed Guam, a second LST was allotted to lift most of the remaining supplies, including the tractors of Company A, 4th Amphibian tractor Battalion.

Loading began at 1600, 14 August and continued throughout the night. The troops boarded ship between 1000 and 1200 the following day, and that evening, the transport division sailed for its rendezvous at sea with the Third Fleet. "In a period of approximately 96 hours the Fourth Regimental Combat Team, Reinforced, had been completely reoutfitted, all equipment deficiencies corrected, all elements provided an initial allowance to bring them up to T/O [Table of Organization] and T/A (Table of Allowance] levels, and a thirty-day resupply procured for shipment." 7

Two days prior to the departure of the main body of Task Force Able, General Clement and a nucleus of his headquarters personnel left Guam on the landing ship, vehicle Ozark to join the Third Fleet. There had been no opportunity for preliminary planning, and no definite mission had been received, so the time en route to the rendezvous was spent studying intelligence summaries of the Tokyo Bay area. Halsey's ships were sighted and joined on 18 August, and next morning, Clement and key members of his staff transferred to the battleship Missouri for the first of a round of conferences on the coming operation.

Admiral Badger formed the ships assigned to the Task Force 31 into a separate tactical group on 19 August. The transfer of men and equipment to designated transports by means of breeches buoys and cargo slings began immediately. Carriers, battleships, and cruisers were brought along both sides of a transport to expedite the operation. In addition to the landing battalions of bluejackets and Marines, fleet units formed base maintenance companies, a naval air activities organization to operate Yokosuka airfield, and nucleus crews to take over captured Japanese vessels. Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawling's British Carrier Task Force contributed a landing force of seamen and Royal Marines. in less than three days, the task of transferring at sea some 3,500 men and hundreds of tons of weapons, equipment, and ammunition was accomplished. The newly formed units, as soon as they reported on board their transports, began an intensive program of training for ground combat operations and occupation duties.

On 20 August, the ships carrying the 4th RCT arrived and joined the burgeoning task force. General Clement's command now included the 5,400 men of the reinforced 4th Marines, a three-battalion regiment of approximately 2,000 Marines taken from 32 ships, a naval regiment of about 1,000 men organized from the crews of eight ships into two landing battalions and a battalion of 250 seamen and 200 Royal Marines. To act as a floating reserve for the landing force, five additional battalions of bluejackets were organized and appropriately equipped from within the carrier groups.

Halsey had assigned TF 31 a primary mission of seizing and occupying the Yokosuka Naval Base and its airfield. Initial collateral missions included the demilitarization of the entire Miura Peninsula, which formed the western arm of the headlands enclosing Tokyo Bay, and the seizure of the Zushi area, tentative headquarters for MacArthur, on the southwest coast of the peninsula. Two alternative schemes of maneuver were considered to accomplish these missions. The first contemplated a landing by assault troops on beaches near the town of Zushi, followed by an overland drive eats across the peninsula to secure the naval base for the landing of supplies and reinforcements. The second plan involved a direct landing from within Tokyo Bay on the beaches and docks of Yokosuka naval base and air station, to be followed on order by the occupation of Zushi and the demilitarization of the entire peninsula. All planning by TF 31 was coordinated with that of the Eighth Army, whose commander, Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, had been appointed by MacArthur to command the forces ashore in the occupation of northern Japan.

On 21 August, General eichelberger, who had been informed of the alternative plans formulated by TF 31, directed that the landing be made at the naval base rather than in the Zushi area. Admiral Halsey had recommended the adoption of the Zushi landing plan since it did not involve bringing shipping into restricted Tokyo Bay until assault troops had dealt with "the possibility of Japanese treachery." 8 The weight of evidence, however, was rapidly swinging in support of the theory that the enemy was going to cooperate fully with the occupying forces and that some of the precautions originally thought necessary could now be held in abeyance.

Eichelberger's message also included the information that the 11th Airborne Division was to establish its own airhead at Atsugi airfield a few miles northwest of the north end of the Miura Peninsula. The original plans of the Fleet Landing Force, which had bene made on the assumption that General Clement's men would seize Yokosuka airfield for the airborne operation, had to be changed to provide for a simultaneous Army-Navy landing. A tentative area of responsibility including the cities of Uraga, Kubiri, Yokosuka, and Funakoshi was assigned to Clement's force, and the rest of the peninsula became the responsibility of the 11th Airborne Division.

To insure the safety of Allied warships entering Tokyo Bay, Clement's operation plan detailed the British Landing Force to occupy and demilitarize three small island forts in the Uraga strait at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. To erase the threat of shore batteries and coastal forts, the reserve battalion of the 4th Marines (2/4) was given the mission of landing on Futtsu Saki, a narrow point of land jutting into the eastern side of Uraga Strait. After completing its mission, 2/4 was to reembark in its landing craft and rejoin its regiment. Nucleus crews form the Fleet Naval Landing Force were to enter the inner Yokosuka Harbor prior to H-Hour and take over the damaged battleship Nagato, whose guns commanded the landing beaches.

The 4th Marines, with 1/4 and 3/4 in assault, was schedules to make the initial landing at Yokosuka on L-Day. The battalions of the Fleet Marine and Naval Landing Forces were to land in reserve and take control of specific areas of the naval base and airfield, while the 4th Marines pushed inland to link up with elements of the 11th Airborne Division landing at Atsugi airfield. the cruiser San Diego, Admiral Badger's flagship, 4 destroyers, and 12 gunboats were to be prepared to furnish naval gunfire support on call. Although no direct support planes were assigned approximately 1,000 armed planes would be airborne and available if needed. Although it was hoped that the Yokosuka landing would be uneventful, TF 31 was prepared to deal with either organized resistance or individual fanaticism on the part of the Japanese.

L-Day was originally scheduled for 25 August, but on 20 August, a threatening typhoon forced Admiral Halsey to postpone the landing date to the 28th. SHips were to enter Sagami Wan, the vast outer bay which led to Tokyo Bay, on L minus 2 day. On 25 August, word was received form MacArthur that the typhoon danger would delay Army air operations for 48 hours, and L-Day was consequently set for 30 August, with the Third Fleet entry into Sagami Wan on the 28th.

The Japanese had been warned as early as 15 August to begin mine sweeping in the waters off Tokyo to facilitate the operations of the Third Fleet. On the morning of the entrance into Sagami Wan, Japanese emissaries and pilots were to meet with Rear Admiral Robert B. Carney, Halsey's Chief of Staff, and Admiral Badger on board the Missouri to receive instructions relative to the surrender of the Yokosuka Naval Base and to guide the first Allied ships into anchorages. Halsey was not anxious to keep his ships, many of them small vessels crowded with troops, at sea in typhoon weather, and he asked and received permission from MacArthur to put into Sagami Wan one day early. 9

The Japanese emissaries reported on board the Missouri early on 27 August. They said a lack of suitable mine sweepers had prevented them from clearing Sagami Wan and Tokyo Bay, but the movement of Allied shipping to safe berths in Sagami Wan

under the guidance of Japanese pilots was accomplished without incident. By late afternoon the Third Fleet was anchored at the entrance to Tokyo Bay. American mine sweepers checked the channel leading into the bay and reported it clear.

On 28 August the first American task force, consisting of combat ships of Task Force 31, entered Tokyo Bay and dropped anchor off Yokosuka at 1300. Vice Admiral Totsuka, Commandant of the First Naval District and the Yokosuka Naval Base, and his staff reported to Admiral Badger in the San Diego for further instructions regarding the surrender of his command. Only the absolute minimum of maintenance personnel, interpreters, guides, and guards were to remain in the naval base area the guns of the forts, ships, and coastal batteries commanding the bay were to be rendered inoperative the breechblocks were to be removed form all antiaircraft and dual-purpose guns.

As the naval commanders made arrangements for the Yokosuka landing, a reconnaissance party of Army troops landed at Atsugi airfield to prepare the way for the airborne operation on L-Day. Radio contact was established with Okinawa where the 11th Division was waiting to execute its part in B LACKLIST . The attitude of the Japanese officials, both at Yokosuka and Atsugi, was uniformly one of docility and cooperation, but bitter experience caused the Allied commanders and troops to view with a jaundiced eye the picture of the Japanese as meek and harmless.

There had been a fresh reminder of the ferocity and brutality with which the Japanese had waged war. On the evening of 27 August, two British prisoners of war hailed one of the Third Fleet's picket boats in Tokyo Bay and were taken on board the San Juan, command ship of a specially constituted Allied Prisoner of War Rescue Group. Their harrowing tales of life in the prison camps and of the extremely poor physical condition of many of the prisoners prompted Halsey to order the rescue group to stand by for action on short notice. On 29 August, the Missouri and the San Juan task group entered Tokyo Bay. At 1420, Admiral nimitz arrived by seaplane and authorized Halsey to begin rescue operations immediately. 10 Special teams, guided and guarded by carrier planes overhead, immediately started the enormous task of bringing in the prisoners form the many large camps in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. By 1910 that evening, the first RAMP's (Rescued Allied Military Prisoners) arrived on board the hospital ship Benevolence, and at midnight 739 men had been brought out. 11

Long before dawn on L-Day, the first group of transports of TF 31 carrying 2/4 began moving into Tokyo Bay. All the plans of the Yokosuka Occupation Force had been based on an H-Hour for the main landing of 1000, but last-minute word was received from MacArthur on 29 August that the first serials of the 11th Airborne Division would be landing at Atsugi airfield at 0600. Consequently, to preserve the value and impact of simultaneous Army-Navy operations, TF 31's plans were changed to allow for the earlier landing time.

The first landing craft carrying Marines of 2/4 touched the south shore of Futtsu Saki at 0558 two minutes later, the first transport plane rolled to a stop on the runway at Atsugi, and the occupation of Japan was underway. in both areas the Japanese had followed their instructions to the letter. On Futtsu Saki the coastal guns and mortars had been rendered useless, and only the bare minimum of maintenance personnel, 22 men, remained to make a peaceful turnover of the forts and batteries. By 0845, the battalion had accomplished its mission and was reembarking for the Yokosuka landing, now scheduled for 0930.

With first light came dramatic evidence that the Japanese would comply with the surrender terms. On every hand, lookouts on Task Force 31 ships could see white flags flying over abandoned and inoperative gun positions. Nucleus crews form the Fleet Naval Landing Force boarded the battleship Nagato at 0805 and received the surrender form a skeleton force of officers and technicians the firing locks of the ship's main battery had been removed and all secondary and AA guns had been dismounted. On the island forts, occupied by the British Landing Force at 0900, the story was much the same the coastal guns had been rendered ineffective, and the few Japanese remaining as guides and interpreters amazed the British with their cooperativeness.

The main landing of the 4th Marines, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fred D. Beans, was almost anticlimactic. Exactly on schedule, the first waves of 1/4 and 3/4 crossed the line of departure and headed for their respective beaches. At 0930, men of the 1st Battalion landed on Red Beach southeast of Yokosuka airfield and those of the 3d Battalion on Green Beach in the heart of the Navy yard. There was no resistance. The Marines moved forward rapidly, noting that the few unarmed Japanese present wore white armbands, according to instructions, to signify that they were essential maintenance troops, officials, or interpreters. Leaving guards at warehouses, primary installations, and gun positions, the 4th Marines pushed on to reach the designated Initial Occupation Line.

General Clement and his staff landed at 1000 on Green Beach and were met by a party of Japanese officers who formally surrendered the naval base area. "They were informed that noncooperation or opposition of any kind would be severely dealt with." 12 Clement then proceeded to the Japanese headquarters building where an American flag presented by the 6th Marine Division was officially raised. 13

Vice Admiral Totsuka had been ordered to be present on the docks of the naval base to surrender the entire First Naval District to Admiral Carney, acting for Admiral Halsey, and Admiral Badger. The San Diego, with Carney and Badger on board, tied up at the dock at Yokosuka at 1030. The surrender took place shortly thereafter with appropriate ceremony, and Badger, accompanied by Clement, departed for the Japanese Naval Headquarters building to set up the headquarters of TF 31.

With operations proceeding satisfactorily at Yokosuka and in the occupation zone of the 11th Airborne Division, General Eichelberger took over operational control of the Fleet Landing Force from Halsey at 1200. Both of the top American commanders in the Allied drive across the Pacific set foot on Japanese soil on L-Day General MacArthur landed at Atsugi Airfield at 1419 to being more than five years as Japan's de facto ruler, and Admiral Nimitz, accompanied by Halsey, came ashore at Yokosuka at 1330 to make an inspection of the naval base.

Reserves and reinforcements landed at Yokosuka during the morning and early afternoon according to schedule. The Fleet Naval Landing Force took over the area secured by 3/4, and the Fleet Marine Landing Force occupied the airfield installations seized by 1/4. The British Landing Force, after evacuating all Japanese personnel form the island forts, landed at the navigation school in the naval base and took over the area between the sectors occupied by the Fleet Naval and Marine Landing Forces. Azuma Peninsula, a large hill mass extensively tunnelled as a small boat supply base, which was part of the British occupation area, was investigated by a force of Royal Marines and found deserted.

The 4th Marines, relieved by the other elements of the landing force, moved out to the Initial Occupation Line and set up a perimeter defense for the naval base and airfield. Patrol contact was made with the 11th Airborne Division which had landed 4,200 men during the day.

The first night ashore was uneventful, marked only by routine guard duty. General MacArthur's orders to disarm and demobilize had been carried out with amazing speed. There was no evidence that the Japanese would do anything but cooperate with the occupying troops. The Yokosuka area, for example, which had formerly been garrisoned by about 50,000 men, now held less than a tenth of that number in skeletal headquarters, processing, maintenance, police, and mine sweeping units. It was clear that militarily, at least, the occupation was slated for success.

ON 31 August, the Fleet Landing Force continued to consolidate its hold on the naval base area. Company L of 3/4 sailed in two destroyer transports to Tateyama Naval Air Station on the northeastern shore of Sagami Wan to reconnoiter the beach approaches and cover the 3 September landing of the 112th Cavalry RCT. Her again the Japanese were waiting peacefully to carry out their surrender instructions.

Occupation operations continued to run smoothly as preparations were made to accept the surrender of Japan on board the Missouri. Leading Allied commanders gathered from every corner of the Pacific. At 0930 on 2 September, under the flag that Commodore Perry had flown in Tokyo Bay in 1854, the Japanese

representatives of the Emperor, Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, and of the Imperial General Staff, General Yoshijiro Umezu, signed the formal surrender documents. 14 General MacArthur then signed as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and Admiral Nimitz for the United States, and they were followed in turn by the senior Allied representatives. The war that had started at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 was officially ended.

Even as the surrender ceremony was taking place on the main deck of the Missouri, advance elements of the main body of the Eighth Army's occupation force were entering Tokyo harbor. Ships carrying the Headquarters of the XI Corps and the 1st Cavalry Division docked at Yokohama. Transports with 112th Cavalry RCT on board moved to Tateyama, and on 3 September the troopers landed and relieved Company L, 3/4, which then returned to Yokosuka.

As the occupation operation proceeded without any notable obstacles being discovered, plans were laid to dissolve the Fleet Landing Force and TF 31. The 4th Marines was selected to take over responsibility for the entire naval base area. By 6 September, ships' detachments of bluejackets and Marines had returned to parent vessels and the provisional landing units were deactivated.

While a large part of the strength of the Fleet Landing Force was returning to normal duties, a considerable augmentation to Marine strength in northern Honshu was being made. On 23 August, AirFMFPac had designated Marine Aircraft Group-31 (MAG-31), then at Chimu airfield on Okinawa, to move to Japan as a supporting air group for the northern occupation. Colonel John C. Munn, its commanding officer, had reconnoitered Yokosuka airfield soon after the initial landing, and on 7 September the first echelon of his headquarters and the planes of Marine Fighter Squadron 441 (VMF-441) flew in from Okinawa. Surveillance flights over the Tokyo Bay area began the following day as additional squadrons of the group continued to arrive. Initially, Munn's planes served under Third Fleet command, but on 16 September, MAG-31 came under operational control of Fifth Air Force.

Admiral Badger's TF 31 had been dissolved on 8 September when the Commander, Fleet Activities, yokosuka, assumed responsibility to SCAP for the naval occupation area. General Clement's command continued to function for a short time thereafter while most of the reinforcing units of the 4th Marines loaded out for return to Guam. On 20 September, Lieutenant Colonel Beans relieved General Clement of his responsibilities at Yokosuka, and the general and his Task Force Able staff flew back to Guam to rejoin the 6th Division. Before he left, however, Clement was able to take part in a ceremony in which 120 RAMPs of the "Old" 4th Marines, captured at Corregidor, received the colors of the "New" 4th from the hands of the men who had carried on the regimental tradition in the Pacific War. 15

After the initial major contribution of naval land forces to the occupation of northern Japan, the operation became more and more an Army task. As additional troops arrived, the Eighth Army's area of effective control grew to include all of northern Japan. In October, the occupation zone of the 4th Marines was reduced to include only the naval base, airfield, and town of Hokosuka. In effect, the regiment became a naval base guard detachment, and on 1 November, control of the 4th Marines passed from Eighth Army to the Commander, U.S. Fleet Activities, Yokosuka.

In addition to routine security and military police patrols, the Marines also carried out Eighth Army demilitarization directives, collecting and disposing of Japanese military and naval matériel. Patrols form the regiment supervised the unloading at Uraga of Japanese garrison troops returning by bypassed Pacific outposts.

On 20 November, the 4th Marines was removed from administrative control of the 6th Division and came directly under FMFPac. Orders were received directing that preparations be made fo 3/4 to relieve the regiment of its duties in Japan, effective 31 December. In common with the rest of the Armed Forces, the Marine Corps faced great public and Congressional pressure to send its men home for discharge as rapidly as possible. Its world-wide commitments had to be examined with this in mind. The Japanese attitude of cooperation with occupation authorities fortunately permitted considerable reduction of troops strength.

In Yokosuka, Marines who did not meet the age, service, or dependency point totals necessary for discharge in December or January 16 were transferred to the 3d Battalion, while men with the requisite number of points were concentrated in the 1st and 2d Battalions. On 1 December, 1/4 completed loading out and sailed for the States to be disbanded. The 3d Battalion, reinforced by the regimental units and a casual company formed to provide replacements for ships' Marine detachments, relieved 2/4 of all guard responsibilities on 24 December. The 2d Battalion with Regimental Weapons and Headquarters and Service Companies loaded out between 27-30 December and sailed for the U.S. on New Year's Day.

The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines, assumed the duties of the regiment at midnight on 31 December, although a token regimental headquarters remained in Yokosuka to carry on the name of the 4th Marines. On FMFPac order, this headquarters detachment left Japan on 6 January to join the 6th Marine Division in Tsingtao, North China.

On 15 February, 3/4 was reorganized and redesignated the 2d Separate Guard Battalion (Provisional), FMFPac. Its military police and security duties in the naval base area remained the same. most of the occupation tasks of demilitarization in

the limited are of the naval base had been completed, and the battalion settled into a routine of guard, ceremonies, and training little different than that of any Navy yard barracks detachment in the United States.

The continued cooperation of the Japanese with SCAP occupation directives and the lack of any overt signs of resistance considerably lessened the need for the fighter squadrons of MAG-31. On 7 October, it was returned to Navy control by Fifth Air Force. Regular reconnaissance flights in the Tokyo area were discontinued on 15 October, and the operations of the air group were confined largely to mail, courier, transport, and training flights. Personnel and unit reductions similar to those necessary in the 4th Marines also affected the air units. By spring of 1946, the need for Marine participation in the occupation of Japan had considerably lessened, and early in May, MAG-31 received orders to return as a unit to the United States. By 20 June, all serviceable aircraft had been shipped out and on that date the transport carrying the group's personnel left Japan.

The departure of MAG-31 marked the end of Marine occupation activities in northern Japan and closed the final chapter of the Yokosuka operation.

Sasebo-Nagasaki Landings 17

The favorable reports of Japanese compliance with surrender terms in northern Japan allowed considerable changes to be made in the operation plans of Sixth Army and Fifth Fleet. Prisoner of war evacuation groups could be sent into port of southern Honshu and Kyushu prior to the arrival of occupation troops, and the main landings could be made administratively without the show of force originally thought necessary. In fact, before the first troop echelon of Sixth Army arrived in Japan, almost all of the RAMPs and civilian internees had bee released from their prisons and processed for evacuation by sea or air.

Japanese authorities received orders form SCAP to bring Allied prisoners into designated processing centers on Honshu and Kyushu. In the Eighth Army occupation zone, Yokohama was the center of recovery activities, and by 21 September, 17,531 RAMPs and internees (including over 7,500 from the Sixth Army area) had been examined there and hospitalized or evacuated. 18 On 12 September, after Fifth Fleet mine sweepers had cleared the way, a prisoner recovery group put into Wakayama in western Honshu and began processing RAMPs. In less than three days, the remainder of the prisoners in the Sixth Army area on Honshu and those from Shikoku, in all 2,575 men, had been embarked in evacuation ships.

Atom-bombed Nagasaki, which has one of Japan's finest natural harbors, was chosen as the evacuation port for men imprisoned in Kyushu. Mine sweeping of the approaches to the port began on 8 September, and the RAMP evacuation group was able to enter on the 11th. The operation was essentially completed by the time occupation troops began landing in Nagasaki over 9,000 prisoners were recovered.

While the Eighth Army was extending its hold over northern Japan, and recovery teams and evacuation groups were clearing the fetid prison compounds, preparations for the Sixth Army's occupation of western Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu continued. The occupation area contained 55 per cent of the total Japanese population, including half of the presurrender home garrison, three of Japan's four major naval bases, all but two of its principal ports, four of its six largest cities, and three of its four main transportation centers. Kyushu, which was destined to be largely a Marine occupation responsibility, supported a population of 10,000,000 in 15,000 square miles of precipitous terrain. Like all of Japan, every possible foot of the island was intensely cultivated, and enough rice and sweet potatoes were produced to allow inter-island export. The main value of Kyushu to the Japanese economy, however, was its industries. The northwest half of the island contains extensive coal fields, Japan's greatest pig iron and steel district, and many important shipyards, plus a host of smaller manufactories.

The V Amphibious Corps (VAC), initially composed of the 2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions, had been given the task of occupying Kyushu and adjacent areas of western Honshu in Sixth Army plans, while the Army's I Corps and X Corps took control of the rest of western Honshu and Shikoku. The Fifth Fleet, under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, was responsible for collecting transporting, and landing the scattered elements of General Walter Kreuger's army. 19 Because of a lack of adequate shipping, the Marine amphibious corps was not able to move its major units to the target simultaneously. Therefore, it was necessary that the transport squadron which lifted the 5th Marine Division and VAC Headquarters from the Hawaiian Islands be then sent to the Philippines to load out the 32d Infantry Division, which was substituted on 6 September for the 3d Marine Division in the occupation force. 20

The first objective to be secured in the VAC zone under Sixth Army's plans was the naval base at Sasebo in northwestern Kyushu. Its occupation by the 5th Marine Division was to be followed by the seizure by the 2d Marine Division of Nagasaki, 30 air miles to the south. When the turn-around shipping arrived, the 32d Infantry Division was to occupy the Fukuoka-Shimonoseki area, either by an overland move from Sasebo or a direct landing, if the mined waters of Fukuoka harbor allowed. Once effective control had been established over the entry port area, the subordinate units of VAC's divisions would gradually spread out over the entire island of Kyushu and the Yamaguchi Prefecture of Honshu to complete the occupation tasks assigned by SCAP.

Major General Harry Schmidt, VAC commander, opened his command post on board the Mt. McKinley off Maui in the Hawaiian Islands on 1 September and sailed to join the 5th Division convoy, already en route to Saipan. LST and LSM (Landing Ship, Medium) groups left the Hawaiian area on 3 September with corps troops and the numerous Army augmentation units necessary to make the combat units an effective occupation force. At Saipan, the various transport groups rendezvoused and units of the 2d Marine Division embarked. Conferences were held to clarify plans for the operations, and two advance reconnaissance parties were dispatched to Japan. One, led by Colonel Walter W. Wensinger, VAC Operations Officer, and consisting of key staff officers of corps and the 2d Division flew to Nagasaki, where they arrived with beachmaster representatives and 5th Division personnel included, left for Sasebo by high speed transport (APD) on 15 September. The mission of the advance parties was:

. . . to facilitate smooth and orderly entry of U.S. forces into the Corps zone of responsibility by making contact with key Japanese civil and military authorities to execute advance spot checks on compliance with demilitarization orders and to ascertain such facilities for reception of our forces as condition and suitability of docks and harbors adequacy of sites selected by map reconnaissance for Corps installations condition of airfields, roads, and communications. 21

After issuing instructions to Japanese officials at Nagasaki, Colonel Wensinger and the corps staff members proceeded by destroyer to Sasebo where preliminary arrangements were made for the arrival of the 5th Division. On 20 September, the second reconnaissance party arrived at Sasebo, contacted Wensinger, and completed preparations for the landing.

At dawn on 22 September (A-Day), the transport squadron carrying Major General Thomas E. Bourke's 4th Marine Division and corps headquarters troops arrived off Sasebo. Members of the advance party transferred from an APD which met the convoy and reported to their respective unit command ships. At 0859, after Japanese pilots had directed the transports to safe berths in Sasebo's inner harbor, the 26th Marines (less 3/26) began landing on beaches at the naval air station. As the men advanced rapidly inland, relieving Japanese guards on naval base installations and stores, ships carrying other elements of the division moved to the Sasebo docks to begin general unloading. The shore party, reinforced by the 2d Battalion, 28th Marines, was completely ashore by 1500 and had started cargo unloading operations which continued through the night.

The rest of the 28th Marines, in division reserve, remained on board ship on A-Day. The 1st Battalion of the 27th Marines landed on the docks in late afternoon and moved out to occupy

its regiment's assigned zone of responsibility. Before troop unloading was suspended at dusk, two artillery battalions of the 13th Marines and regimental headquarters had landed on beaches in the aircraft factory area, and the 5th Tank Battalion had come ashore at the air station. All units ashore established guard posts and security patrols, but the division's first night in Japan passed uneventfully.

On 23 September, as most of the remaining elements of the 5th Division landed and General Bourke set up his command post ashore, patrols started probing the immediate countryside. Company C( reinforced) of the 27th Marines was sent to Omura, about 22 miles southeast of Sasebo, to establish a security guard over the naval air training station there. Omura's airfield had been selected as the base of Marine air operations in southern Japan.

A reconnaissance party, led by Colonel Daniel W. Torrey, Commanding Office of MAG-22, had landed and inspected the field on 14 September, and the advance flight echelon of his air group had flown in from Okinawa six days later. Corsairs of VMF-113 reached Omura on 23 September, and the rest of the group's flight echelon arrived before the month was over. MAG-22's primary mission was similar to that of MAG-31 at Yokosuka: surveillance flights in support of occupation operations.

As flight operations started at Omura and the 5th Division consolidated its hold on Sasebo, the second major element of VAC landed in Japan. The early arrival of the 2d Division's transports at Saipan, coupled with efficient staging and loading, had enabled planners to move its landing date forward tow days. When reports were received that the approaches to the originally selected landing beaches were mined but that Nagasaki's harbor was clear, the decision was made to land directly into the harbor area. At 1300 on 23 September, the 2d and 6th Marines landed simultaneously on the east and west sides of the harbor.

The Marine detachments from the cruiser Biloxi and Wichita, which had been serving as security guards in Nagasaki for RAMP operations, were relieved by 3/2. The two regiments moved out swiftly to occupy the city and curtain off the atom-devastated area. Ships were brought alongside wharfs and docks to facilitate cargo handling, and unloading operations were well underway by nightfall. A quiet calm ruled the city to augur a peaceful occupation.

ON 24 September, as the rest of Major General Leroy P. Hunt's 2d Division began landing, the corps commander arrived from Sasebo by destroyer to inspect the Nagasaki area. General Schmidt had established his CP ashore at Sasebo the previous day and taken command of the two Marine divisions. The only other major allied unit ashore in Kyushu, an Army task force that was occupying Kanoya airfield in the southernmost part of

the island, was transferred to General Schmidt's command from the Far Eastern Air Force on 1 October. This force, which was built around a reinforced battalion (1/127) of the 32d Infantry Division, had been flown into Kanoya on 3 September to secure an emergency field on the aerial route to Tokyo from Okinawa and the Philippines.

General Krueger, well satisfied with the progress of the occupation in the VAC zone, assumed command of all forces ashore at 1000 on 24 September. The first major elements of Sixth Army's other corps began landing at Wakayama the next day. On every hand, there was ample evidence that the occupation of southern Japan would be bloodless.

Among the troops of VAC, whose previous experience with the Japanese in surrender had been "necessarily meager," considerable speculation developed regarding:

. . . to what extent and how, if at all, the Japanese nation would comply with the terms of surrender imposed. . . . The only thing which could be predicted from the past was that the Japanese reaction would be unpredictable. 22

And it was. In fact, the eventual key to the pattern and sequence of VAC occupation operations was "the single outstanding fact that Japanese compliance with the terms was as nearly correct as could humanly be expected." 23

Kyushu Occupation 24

Instead of instituting direct military rule, the responsible occupation force commanders were to supervise the execution of SCAP directives to the Japanese government, keeping in mind MacArthur's policy of using, but not supporting, that government. 26 The military forces were to be disarmed and demobilized under their own supervision, and the progressive occupation of assigned areas by Allied forces was to be accomplished as Japanese demobilization was completed.

The infantry regiment (and divisional artillery operating as infantry) was to be "the chief instrument of demilitarization and control. The entire plan for the imposition of the terms of

  1. That to be destroyed or scrapped (explosives and armaments not need for souvenirs and training purposes).

  2. That to be used for our operations (telephones, radios, and vehicles).

  3. That to be returned to the Japanese Home Ministry (fuel, lumber, etc.).

  4. That to be issued as trophies.

  5. That to be shipped to the U.S. as trophies or training gear. 28

The dangerous job of explosive ordnance disposal was handled by the Japanese with the bare minimum of American supervision. Explosives were either dumped at sea or burned in approved areas. Weapons and equipment declared surplus to the needs of occupation troops were converted into scrap, mainly by Japanese labor, and then turned over to the Home Ministry for use in essential civilian industries. Food stuffs and other non-military stocks were returned to the Japanese for distribution.

Although prefectural police maintained civil law and order and enforced democratization decrees issued at the instance of SCAP, constant surveillance was maintained over Japanese methods of government. Intelligence and military government personnel, working with the occupying troops, acted quickly to stamp out any suggestion of a return to militarism or evasion of the surrender terms. Known or suspected war criminals were apprehended and sent to Tokyo for processing and possible arraignment before an Allied tribunal.

In addition to exercising supervisory control of Japanese demobilization of the home garrison, occupation troops were responsible for insuring the smooth processing of hundreds of thousands of military personnel and civilians returning from the outposts of the now defunct Empire. At the same time, thousands of Korean, Formosan, and Chinese prisoners and "voluntary" laborers had to be collected, pacified, 29 housed and fed, and returned to their homelands. In all repatriation operations, Japanese vessels and crews were used to the fullest extent possible in order to conserve Allied manpower and allow for an accelerated program of postwar demobilization.

The pattern of progressive occupation called for in SCAP plans was quickly established in the VAC zone of responsibility:

After the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions had landed, VAC's general plan was for the 2d Marine Division to expand south of Nagasaki to assume control of the Nagasaki, Kumamoto, Miyazaki, and Kagoshima Prefectures. The 5th Marine Division in the meantime was to extend east to the prefectures of Saga, Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi. The latter division was to be relieved in the Fukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi areas upon the arrival of sufficient elements of the 32d Division. 30

The decision to occupy Fukuoka, largest city in Kyushu and administrative center of the northwestern coal and steel region, was made almost immediately after the initial landings. Because the waters of Fukuoka harbor were liberally sown with mines, the movement to the city was made by rail and road form Sasebo. An advance party, headed by Colonel Wensinger, reached Fukuoka on 27 September, and the leading elements of the occupation force began arriving on 30 September. Brigadier General Ray A.

Robinson, Assistant Division Commander of the 5th Marine Division, was given command of the force which consisted of the 28th Marines (reinforced) and Army augmentation detachments.

The Fukuoka Occupation Force (FOF), which was placed directly under VAC command, began sending reconnaissance parties followed by company=and battalion-sized occupation forces to the major cities of northern Kyushu and Yamaguchi Prefecture. Because of the limited number of troops available to FOF, Japanese guards were left in charge of most military installations, and effective control of the zone was maintained through the use of motorized surveillance patrols.

In order to prevent possible outbreaks of mob violence, Marine guard detachments were set up to administer the Chinese labor camps found in the area, and Japanese Army supplies were requisitioned to feed and clothe the former POWs and laborers. Some of the supplies were also used to subsist the swarms of Koreans who gathered in temporary camps near the principal repatriation ports of Fukuoka and Senzaki (Yamaguchi Prefecture) while they awaited shipping to return to their homeland. The Marines supervised the loading out of the Koreans and made continuous checks on the processing and discharge procedures used to handle the Japanese troops who returned with each incoming vessel. In addition to its repatriation activities, the FOF located and inventoried vast quantities of Japanese military matériel for later disposition by the 32d Infantry Division.

As General Robinson's force took control of Fukuoka and Yamaguchi Prefectures, the 5th Marine Division was expanding its hold on the area east of Sasebo. On 5 October, the division zone of responsibility was extended to include Saga Prefecture and the city of Kurume in the center of the island. The 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, moved to Saga city, operating for a short time as an independent occupation group until, on 24 October, the regiment (less 1/27) established its headquarters in Kurume and assumed responsibility for the central portion of the division zone, which now extended to the east coast (Oita Prefecture). Through all these troop movements, the maintenance of roads and bridges was a constant problem since the inadequate road net quickly disintegrated when punished by the combination of heavy rains and extensive military traffic. The burden of supplying and transporting the scattered elements of VAC was borne by the Japanese rail system. 31

When it was decided to occupy Oita Prefecture, the entire 180-mile trip from Sasebo to Oita city was made by rail. The occupation force, Company A (reinforced) of the 5th Tank Battalion operating as infantry. 32 set up in the city on 15 October and conducted a reconnaissance of the military installations in the coastal prefecture by means of motorized patrols. Because of its size, the company served as an advance party for 32d Division troops, and its was forced to rely on Japanese labor for most of its matériel inventory work.

The 13th Marines, occupying the area to the south and east of Sasebo in Nagasaki and Saga Prefectures, supervised the processing of Japanese repatriates returning from China and Korea, and handled the disposition of the weapons, equipment, and ammunition which were stored in naval depots near Sasebo and Kawatana. The 1st Battalion, 27th Marines, which was detached form its regiment, was stationed in Sasebo under division control and furnished a portion of the city's garrison as well as detachments which investigated the island groups offshore.

The 26th Marines, whose patrols ranged the hinterland north and east of Sasebo, head a very short tour of duty in Japan. On 13 October, the regiment was alerted for transfer to the Palau Islands. 33 While it made preparations to move to Peleliu and supervise the repatriation of Japanese troops form the Western Carolines, the first elements of the 32d Division began landing at Sasebo. The 128th Infantry, followed by the 126th Infantry and division troops, moved straight on through the port and entrained for Fukuoka where the Army units came temporarily under the command of FOF. THe V Amphibious Corps placed the 127th Infantry (less 1/127), which landed on 18-19 October, under operational control of the 5th Division to take over the 26th Marines' zone of responsibility.

The Marine regiment began boarding ship on 18 October and 127th Infantry units moved into the vacated billets. On 19 October, the 26th Marines was detached form the division and returned to FMFPac control as loading continued. Before the transports departed on 21 October, however, orders were received from FMFPac designating 2/26 for disbandment, and the battalion returned to the Marine Camp, Ainoura (5th Division Headquarters just outside of Sasebo). On 31 October, 2/26, the first of many war-born Marine infantry battalions to end its Pacific service, passed out of existence and its men were transferred to other units.

While Brigadier General Robert B. McBride, Jr.'s 32d Infantry Division was moving north to take over the area occupied by the Fukuoka and Oita Occupation Forces, the 2d Marine Division was gradually expanding its hold on southern Kyushu. The 2d and 6th Marines had moved into billets in the vicinity of Nagasaki immediately after landing with the mission of surveillance and disposition of enemy military matériel in the immediate countryside and on the many small islands nearby. The 8th and 10th Marines had gone directly from their transports to barracks at Isahaya (near Nagasaki) where patrolling was initiated in the peninsula to the south and the rest of Nagasaki Prefecture in the 2d Division zone.

ON 4 October, VAC changed the boundary between divisions to include Omura in General Hunt's command. The 5th Division security detachment at the Marine air base was relieved by 3/10 and returned to parent control. Shortly thereafter, the 10th Marines also took over the whole of the 8th Marines' area in Nagasaki Prefecture.

The corps expanded the 2d Division zone on 5 October to include all of highly-industrialized Kumamoto Prefecture. An advance billeting, sanitation, and reconnaissance party of the 8th Marines travelled to Kumamoto city in the southwestern part of the island to contact Japanese authorities and pave the way for the regiment's assumption of control. By 18 October, all units of the 8th Marines had established themselves in and around Kumamoto and begun the by-now familiar process of inventory and disposition. In line with SCAP directives outlining measures to restore the civilian economy to a self-supporting level, the Marines assisted the local government wherever necessary to speed the conversion of war plants to essential peacetime production.

The remaining unoccupied portion of Kyushu was taken over by the 2d Division within the next month. Advance parties headed by senior field officers contacted civil and mililtary officials in Kagoshima and Miyazaki Prefectures to insure compliance with surrender terms and adequate preparations for the reception of division troops. Miyazaki Prefecture and the half of Kagoshima east of Kagoshima Wan were assigned to the 2d Marines. The remaining half of Kagoshima Prefecture was added to the 8th Marines' zone later, the regiment was also given responsibility for conducting occupation operations in the Osumi and Koshiki island groups which lay to the south and southwest of Kyushu.

On 29 October, a motor convoy carrying the major part of 1/8 moved form Kumamoto to Kagoshima city to assume control of western Kagoshima. The battalion had to start anew the routine of reconnaissance, inspection, inventory, and disposition that had occupied it twice before. The 2d Battalion, 2d Marines, assigned to the eastern half of Kagoshima, found much of its preliminary occupation spadework done for it. The Army task force at Kanoya had been actively patrolling the area since it had come under VAC command. When 2/2, loaded in four LSTs, arrived from Nagasaki on 27 October, it was relatively easy to effect a relief. The Marines landed at Takasu, port for Kanoya, and moved by rail and road to the airfield. On 30 October, 2/2 assumed from 1/127 the operational control of the Army Air Force detachment manning the emergency field, and the 32d Division battalion prepared to return to Sasebo to rejoin its regiment.

The remainder of the 2d Marines also moved by sea from Sasebo to Takasu and thence by rail to Miyazaki Prefecture in early November. Regimental Headquarters and 3/2 set up their base of operations at Miyakonojo, and the 1st Battalion moved into billets in Miyazaki city. By 14 November, with the occupation of Miyazaki, VAC had established effective control over its entire zone of responsibility.

The Fukuoka Occupation Force had been dissolved on 24 October when the 32d Infantry Division opened its command post in Fukuoka. A base command, comprising the service elements

that had been assigned to General Robinson's force, was set up to support the operations in Northern Kyushu and continued to function until 25 November when the 32d Division took over its duties. The 28th Marines and the 5th Tank Battalion occupation forces were relived by Army units: the 128th RCT 34 took over Yamaguchi Prefecture, the 126th patrolled Fukuoka and Oita Prefectures, and the 127th, after its relief by the 28th Marines, occupied Fukuoka and the zone to the south.

By the end of November, VAC could report substantial progress in its major occupation tasks. Over 700,000 Japanese returning from overseas had been processed through ports and separation centers under corps control. The tide of humanity had not all flowed in one direction,k since 273, 276 Koreans, Chinese, and Okinawans had been sent back to their homelands. on 2 December, only about 20,000 Japanese Army and Navy personnel remained on duty, all employed in demobilization, repatriation, mine sweeping, and similar activities. On that date, in accordance with SCAP directives, these men were transferred to civilian status under newly created government ministries and bureaus. The destruction or other disposition of war matériel proceeded satisfactorily with surprisingly few mishaps 35 considering the enormous quantity of old and faulty munitions that had to be handled.

The need for large numbers of combat troops in Japan steadily lessened as the occupation wore on, and it became increasingly obvious that the Japanese intended to offer no resistance. The first major Marine unit to fulfill its mission in southern Japan and return to the United States was MAG-22.

On 14 October, Admiral Spruance, acting for CinCPac, had queried the Fifth Air Force as to whether the Marine fighter group was still considered necessary to the Sasebo area garrison. On 25 October, the Army replied that MAG-22 was no longer needed, and it was returned to operational control of the Navy. The group's service squadron and heavy equipment which had just arrived from Okinawa were kept on board ship, and in less than a week AirFMFPac directed that the unit return to the States. Its planes were flown to an aircraft replacement pool on Okinawa, and low-point men were transferred to MAG-31 as replacements for men eligible for rotation or discharge. On 20 November, after picking up MAG-31's returnees at Yokosuka and similar Army troops at Yokohama, MAG-22 left for home. The Marine Air Base, Omura remained in operation, but its aircraft strength consisted mainly of light liaison and observation planes of the observation squadrons assigned to VAC divisions. 36

The redeployment of MAG-22 was only a small part of the general pattern for withdrawing excess occupation forces. On 12 November, Sixth Army was informed by VAC that the 5th Marine Division would be released from its duties for return to the United States on 1 December. By the turn of the year, the 2d marine Division would be the only major Marine unit remaining on occupation duty in southern Japan.

Marine Withdrawal 37

Only about 10 percent of the Marines in VAC had been returned to the States by 30 November, although discharge and rotation directives had made more than 15,000 men eligible. Divisions were under orders to maintain their strength at 90 percent of T/O, and this severely curtailed the number of men who could be released. Replacements were almost nonexistent in this period of postwar reduction. yet the 2d Division, which was to remain in Japan, had 7,653 officers and men who were entitled to a trip home. 38 To meet this problem, VAC ordered an interchange of personnel between the 2d and 5th Marine Divisions.

High-point men of the 2d Division would be transferred to units of the 5th Division, while men not yet eligible for discharge or rotation would move from the 5th to the 2d to take their places. Almost half of the 2d Division and 80 percent of the 5th Division, in all about 18,000 Marines and corpsmen, were slated for transfer. At the same time the personnel exchanges were taking place, elements of the 2d and 32d Divisions would occupy the 5th Division zone of responsibility so that the occupation missions of surveillance, disposition of matéeriel, and repatriation could continue without interruption. ,p> On 24 November, control of Saga and Fukuoka Prefectures passed to the 2d and 32d Divisions, respectively. In the first of a series of comparable troop movements, 2/6 entrained for Saga to take over the duties of the low-point men of 2/27. The 6th and 10th Marines occupied the 5th Division zone, relieved units of the 13th, 27th, and 28th Marines, and effected the necessary personnel transfers. The 2d and 8th Marines sent their returnees to Sasebo, the 5th Division's port of embarkation, and joined new men from the 5th's infantry regiments. Separate battalions and division troops of both units exchanged men with their opposite numbers.

The 5th Division began loading out as soon as ships were available at Sasebo, and on 5 December, the first transports, carrying men of the 27th Marines, left for the States. The 2d Division assumed all of the 5th Division's remaining occupation responsibilities on 8 December, and the last elements of the 5th Division departed Sasebo 11 days later.

Starting on 20 December, with the arrival of the first troopships of the 27th Marines at San DIego, a steady stream of officers and men passed through reassignment and discharge centers at Camp Pendleton. During January, most of the component elements of the division were skeletonized and then disbanded. On 5 February 1946, the Headquarters Battalion followed suit "and the 5th Marine Division passed into history." 39

On the same date that the 2d Marine Division took over the duties of the 5th, VAC received a dispatch directive from Sixth Army stating that the corps would be relived of all occupation responsibilities on 31 December when the Eighth Army relieved the Sixth. The Eighth Army was to assume command of all Allied occupation troops in japan, and plans were laid to reduce American strength to the point where only those units considered a part of the peacetime Armed Forces would remain. I Corps, with headquarters at Osaka (later Kyoto), would take over VAC's area and its troops.

The V Corps spent most of its remaining time in Japan completing its current occupation missions, supervising the transfer of low-point men to 2d Division units, and preparing to turn over its area to I Corps. The changeover took place as ordered on 31 December, and corps troops began loading out the following day,l some units for return to the United States and others for duty with Marine supply activities on Guam. On 8 January, the last elements of VAC, including General Schmidt's headquarters, left Sasebo for San Diego. On 15 February 1946, the V Amphibious Corps was disbanded. 40

Not long after the departure of VAC, the 2d Marine Division became responsible for the whole of what had been the corps zone. The 32d infantry Division, a former Michigan-Wisconsin National Guard outfit, was one of those Army units slated for deactivation early in 1946. In preparation for taking over the 32d Division duties in Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, and Oita Prefectures, the 2d Division began moving units of the 6th Marines north to the Army zone and increasing the size of the areas assigned to its other regiments. On 31 January, when the 2d Division formally relieved the 32d, the prefectural responsibilities of the major Marine units were: 2d Marines, Oita and Miyazaki 6th Marines, Yamaguchi, Fukuoka, and Oita 8th Marines, Kumamoto and Kagoshima 10th Marines, Nagasaki.

When Major General Roscoe B. Woodruff, Commanding I Corps, returned to the United States on temporary assignment on 8 February, the 2d Marine Division's Major General Leroy P. Hunt, Jr., as senior division commander, flew to Kyoto and assumed command of the Corps, a position he was to retain until General Woodruff's return on 5 April. The corps zone of responsibility underwent one more change during this period. Advance elements of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) began moving into Hiroshima Prefecture on 4 February and formally took control form the 24th Infantry Division on 7 March. Later that month (23 March), BCOF relieved the 6th Marines in Yamaguchi Prefecture, reducing the 2d Marine Division zone to the island of Kyushu.

By April, it seemed that the constant shifting of units was largely over and that the divisions of I Corps could concentrate mainly on reinstituting regular training schedules. The 2d Marine Division had been pared down to peacetime strength in February when the third battalion of each infantry regiment and the

last lettered battery of each artillery battalion were relived of occupation duties, assembled at Sasebo, and then sent home for disbandment. insofar as possible, the remaining units were assembled in battalion-sized camp areas which served as centers for necessary surveillance activity. Training in basic military subjects, firing of individual and crew-served weapons, and exercises in combat tactics filled increasing amounts of the Marines' time. An efficient air courier service of liaison planes and occasional transports, operating out of Omura Marine Air Base, connected the scattered battalions and enabled the division and regimental commanders to maintain effective control of their units. Most of the disposition work was completed, the tremendous repatriation flow of the first occupation months had slowed, and the Japanese, as well as their conquerors, had settled into a routine of mutual tolerance.

Soon after General Hunt returned form Kyoto, word was received from Eighth Army that the 2d Division would be returned to a permanent base in the United States. The 24th Infantry Division would move to Kyushu and take over the Marine zone. Preparations for the movement got underway before the end of April, as reconnaissance parties of the relieving Army regiments arrived to check their future billeting areas.

General Hunt planned to relive his outlying units first and then gradually draw in his men upon Sasebo until the last unit had shipped out from the port. Oita and Miyazaki were the first prefectures to be handed over to the Army, and their former garrison, the 2d Marines, was the first unit to complete loading out. The regiment left Sasebo on 13 June bound for Norfolk and the 8th Marines followed soon after. General Hunt turned over his zone to the 24th Division on 15 June, and Marine responsibility for the occupation of Kyushu was ended. 41 Division headquarters left on 24 June, and with the exception of service troops and unit rear echelons which remained to load out heavy equipment, the major elements of the 2d marine Division all had departed by 2 July. 42

The first Marines to reach Japan after the war went into Yokosuka half expecting to meet the same implacable foe they had encountered in years of bitter fighting. instead they were confronted with the astonishing sight of a docile people who were anxious to cooperate with their conquerors. As a result of this acceptance of defeat by the Japanese, it was never necessary to institute complete military rule. SCAP directives outlining its program of demilitarization and democratization were put into effect by the Japanese Government which disarmed and demobilized its own military forces and revamped its political structure without serious incident. ,p> The Marines in Kyushu stood by as observers and policemen during many phases of the occupation operation but were directly concerned with others. They supervised the repatriation of thousands of foreign civilians and prisoners of war and handled

the flood of Japanese returning from the defunct overseas empire. Using local labor, they collected, inventoried, and disposed of the vast stockpile of munitions and other military matériel that had been accumulated on Kyushu in anticipation of Allied invasion. Where necessary, they used their own men and equipment to effect emergency repairs of war damage and to help reestablish the Japanese civilian economy.

Within three months after its landing on Kyushu, the V COps had established effective surveillance over the entire island and its ten million people and had set up smoothly functioning repatriation and disposition procedures. The task was so well along by the end of 1945 that responsibility for the whole island could be turned over to one division. Perhaps the most significant benefit to accrue to the Marine Corps in the Japanese occupation was the variegated experience gained by the small unit leaders in fields widely separated from their normal peacetime routine of training and guard duty. They faced heavy responsibilities, and it was largely their ability to adapt themselves to new situations and learn as they went along that made the occupation of Kyushu a success.

There is more to an occupation of two cultures than simply treaties and government protocol. The lived experiences of Japanese civilians and American military personnel are just as important for defining the years of the occupation. During the years between 1946 and 1952, Japanese and American artists alike depicted aspects of life during the occupation through movies, cartoons, art, etc.

The following primary sources portray how the two cultures saw each other, and how what life was like for Japanese and Americans alike.

Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere

According to Japan’s proclamation of war, the war’s purpose was to establish the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere to achieve self-existence and self-prosperity. By means of a reorganization of the political, economic, and social order in Asia, the Asian peoples could be liberated from European colonialism.

In order to advance toward the southern areas with these objectives, the Japanese military needed to “capture the strategic points of Guam and the Bismarck Archipelago to annihilate the enemy in the southern areas.” In other words, Guam was included in the string of islands beginning with Japan, the Ogasawara Islands, Saipan, Tinian, Yap, Palau, Indonesia, New Guinea, and other Pacific islands, needed to accomplish this goal.

The significance of Guam’s occupation by Japan was that the island became part of Japan’s Micronesia (Saipan, Yap, Palau, Truk [now Chuuk], Ponape [now Pohnpei], and the Marshalls), called the South Sea Islands (Nan’yô Guntô). This huge ocean area was Japan’s defence and southward advance base while it was originally a “C” class mandate of the League of Nations and administered by Japan’s South Seas Bureau or Nan’yôchô. In fact, the Japanese Navy planned to administratively integrate Guam into the Saipan District Branch (later renamed the Northern District Branch) of the South Seas Bureau when the war situation became settled.

After the initial occupation, Guam was placed under control of the Japanese Navy’s Fifth Base Force, with its headquarters on Saipan to include Tinian and Rota. Guam, the largest island in Micronesia along with its water sources and large amount of suitable agricultural land, was an indispensable supply base for transiting Japanese military ships. Guam was expected to play a major supply role in the military’s self-sufficiency plans along with the other Mariana Islands, although this was not achieved.

Election Central

In July 1945, shortly after Germany had surrendered, the Allied leaders met at Potsdam near Berlin to discuss postwar policies. Among these was the decision to occupy the Japanese homeland once victory had been achieved in the Pacific. The Allies also agreed that the occupation should bring about the complete disarmament of Japanese forces and the trial of Japanese war criminals. The Potsdam Agreement further called for democratic reforms in Japan's government. Finally, the Allies declared that the occupation would end only when all these conditions had been achieved and "a peacefully inclined and responsible government" had been established in Japan.

Immediately after the Japanese announced their decision to surrender, Gen. Douglas MacArthur was appointed the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to oversee the occupation of Japan. Although he was technically under the authority of an Allied Powers commission, MacArthur took his orders from Washington. Rather than establish an American military government to rule Japan during the occupation, MacArthur decided to employ the existing Japanese government. To do so, he would issue various direct orders to Japanese government officials but allow them to manage the country as long as they followed the occupation goals developed in Potsdam and Washington.

MacArthur realized that imposing a new order on the island nation would be a difficult task even with Japanese cooperation. It would be impossible, MacArthur believed, for foreigners to dictate radical changes to 80 million resentful people.

Having decided to keep the Japanese national legislature (the Diet), the cabinet and the bureaucracy in place, MacArthur next faced the question of Emperor Hirohito. The Russians and British wanted Hirohito tried and hanged as a war criminal. MacArthur advised Washington against needlessly angering the Japanese by destroying the sacred symbol of their emperor. MacArthur later wrote in his autobiography: ". I would need at least one million reinforcements should such an action be taken . Military government would have to be instituted throughout all Japan, and guerrilla warfare would probably break out."

At his first meeting with MacArthur, Hirohito assumed full responsibility for the wartime actions of Japan knowing that this admission could mean his execution. Eventually the U.S. and other Allied powers agreed with MacArthur not to treat Hirohito as a war criminal, but one condition was mandated.

On New Year's Day 1946, four months after the occupation had begun, Emperor Hirohito renounced the belief that he was a divine or godlike being:

The ties between us and our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world.

These words, while shocking to most Japanese, smoothed the way for the more than six years of occupation that were to come.

Certain aspects of the U.S. occupation policy carried out by MacArthur were very harsh. Wartime Prime Minister Tojo and six other leaders were tried and hanged for war crimes. The policies dismantled and abolished the Japanese military establishment and banned 200,000 military and civilian leaders from holding any public office, including the majority of existing Diet members. The large industrial monopolies that had fueled the war effort were broken up. Even government support for the official Japanese religion, Shinto, was eliminated.

At the same time, MacArthur promoted the development of democracy in Japan. He suspended Japanese laws restricting political, civil and religious liberties. He ordered the release' of political prisoners and abolished the secret police. He announced a general election to be held in April 1946, only seven months following the surrender. He also called for the Japanese Diet to pass a new election law to provide for free democratic elections, including, for the first time in the history of Japan, the right of women to vote. In addition, under MacArthur's direction, the growth of labor unions was encouraged, large landholdings were broken up and the education system was reformed.

Surprisingly, all of these developments were accepted and in some cases even welcomed by the Japanese. Of course, Japan was under the control of armed U.S. troops. Still, the ordinary Japanese, seeing death and destruction all around, seemed to conclude that the old way of doing things had failed. War and a humiliating defeat had made Japan ripe for revolutionary change.

A New Constitution

The Meiji Constitution of 1889 concentrated actual political power in the hands of a small group of government leaders responsible to the emperor, not the people. From 1930 to the end of the war this governing group was dominated by the military.

Before 1945, democracy as we know it had little chance to develop in Japan. No free elections or real political parties existed. Women were denied equal rights. From an American viewpoint, although the Meiji Constitution listed a number of individual liberties, few were meaningful. For example, even though free speech was protected by the constitution, the government prohibited what it considered "dangerous thoughts."

Early in the occupation MacArthur saw the need to drastically change the Meiji Constitution. In his autobiography, MacArthur argued:

We could not simply encourage the growth of democracy. We had to make sure that it grew. Under the old constitution, government flowed downward from the emperor, who held the supreme authority, to those to whom he had delegated power. It was a dictatorship to begin with, a hereditary one, and the people existed to serve it.

MacArthur communicated his views to the leaders of the Japanese government who formed a committee to rewrite the Meiji Constitution. After four months' work, by February 1, 1947, the committee had produced a revision with only minor word changes. For instance, in the rewrite the emperor became "supreme" rather than "sacred" as in the old constitution.

MacArthur refused to accept the Japanese revision. He gave his own people the task of writing a "model constitution" which would then be used by the Japanese in preparing another revision, which he wanted completed before the Japanese general. election scheduled just two months away. He saw the election as a test of whether the Japanese people would accept democratic changes in their political system.

The job of writing MacArthur's "model constitution" fell to the Government Section of his General Headquarters. A team, of about a dozen Army and Navy officers (all with special training in government) plus a few civilian experts met secretly to discuss, debate and write their model for a new Japanese constitution. The team members used a 1939 edition of a book on world constitutions as their main reference. Most of the final wording was drafted by three Army officers, all lawyers. This "constitutional convention" lasted a total of six days.

The resulting constitution borrowed from the British system in establishing a cabinet and prime minister who were responsible to the elected Diet. The guarantees of individual rights included wording similar to that found in the American Bill of Rights. One part, guaranteeing equal rights, even went beyond the legal protections Americans enjoyed at that time. Other provisions sounded like they had come from the progressive policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal. For example, workers received the right "to organize and to bargain and act collectively. "

Perhaps the most unique part of the "model constitution" was the "no-war clause." According to Article 9: ". The Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes." Article 9 went on to abolish all land, sea and air military forces. This article was included as the result of a suggestion made by Prime Minister Shidehara to MacArthur. Shidehara believed that this provision would show the rest of the world that Japan never again intended to wage aggressive war.

To the Japanese people, however, the most radical change from the Meiji Constitution was the removal of the emperor as the source of all government authority. In the "model constitution" the people, acting through the elected Diet, were supreme. MacArthur decided to preserve the position of emperor, but merely as "the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people."

The Japanese government leaders were shocked by the radical changes proposed in the "model constitution." In particular, they found it hard to accept the idea of "rule by the people" which conflicted with the Japanese tradition of absolute obedience to the emperor. After disagreeing among themselves, the Japanese cabinet went to the emperor. On February 22, Hirohito ended the deadlock by commanding that the "model" become the basis for the new constitution of Japan. "Upon these principles," Emperor Hirohito said, "will truly rest the welfare of our people and the rebuilding of Japan."

On March 6, the Japanese cabinet accepted the new constitution. This was followed by statements of approval by Emperor Hirohito and Gen. MacArthur who later called the document "the most liberal constitution in history."

The constitution was widely publicized and enthusiastically discussed by the Japanese people, especially during the days leading up to the April general election. When the Dietmet during the summer of 1946, the newly elected legislators debated and then voted final approval. Japan's new democratic constitution went into effect on May 3, 1947.

Has Japan's democratic constitution been a success? MacArthur himself called it "probably the single most important accomplishment of the occupation." Others have since criticized MacArthur for unnecessarily forcing the Japanese to renounce their political traditions and accept democracy too rapidly.

In 1952, the American occupation of Japan ended. The Japanese were again an independent people free to run their country as they wished. Since then, the Japanese have changed or done away with a number of the reforms instituted by MacArthur. One reform remains firmly in place: the "MacArthur Constitution." For 40 years it has never been revised or amended. In the words of Japanese scholar Sodei Rinjiro: "Clearly the constitution has sunk its roots among the people. "

For Discussion

  1. Why was General MacArthur reluctant to impose radical changes on post-World War II Japan and its government?
  2. List several policies General MacArthur used to promote the development of democracy in Japan.
  3. How did the previous Meiji Constitution stifle democracy in Japan?
  4. List several policies of the new Japanese constitution that helped make it democratic.
  5. How did the Japanese people respond to the new constitution?

This activity is designed to be done in class before they read the article in this section. The questions listed below had to be answered by the United States after the surrender of Japan on August 14, 1945.

Meeting in small groups, students should discuss and write down at least one reason for their own answers to both the following questions.

1. Once Japan is occupied, should the Japanese government be totally abolished and replaced by the direct rule of American military authorities?

In Germany the Nazi government had disintegrated as Allied troops closed in on Berlin. Following Germany's defeat, the Allies set up their own military governments to rule in their respective zones of occupation. In Japan, however, the emperor, national legislature (called the Diet), ruling cabinet and the entire government bureaucracy all remained in place at the time of the surrender.

2. Should the U.S. insist that Japan change its constitution in order to establish a democracy?

Japan had a written constitution, a "gift" of the Emperor Meiji in 1889. In many respects its wording made it similar to our own Constitution. However, the Japanese Constitution made the emperor, not the people, the sole source of political authority. Thus, the Meiji Constitution was a blend of western political thought and Japanese traditions that had developed over the centuries.

The two questions listed below had to be answered by the United States after the surrender of Japan on August 14, 1945. Meeting in small groups, students should discuss, answer, and record at least one reason for their answers.


  1. Have students meet in the same groups they did earlier for the "Preliminary Activity."
  2. Ask each group to again answer the two questions from the "Preliminary Activity" and write down at least one reason for each of these decisions, this time referring to the information they got from the reading.
  3. Each group should next compare the answers it wrote in the "Preliminary Activity" with the information it found in the reading.
  4. Each group should report its findings to the class.
  5. Finally, the class as a whole should discuss the following questions:
  • What differences did you find between your own answers to the questions in the "Preliminary Activity" and the actual decisions made by the U.S. and MacArthur? Did you change your mind on any of these questions?
  • Do you think that the experience in occupied Japan proves that the U.S. Constitution can be transplanted to any other land? Why or why not?

("Bringing Democracy to Japan" was adapted from Bill of Rights in Action, Vol. 3:4 © Constitutional Rights Foundation)

Records of U.S. Occupation Headquarters, World War II

Finding Aids: Preliminary Inventory in National Archives microfiche edition of preliminary inventories.

Security-Classified Records: This record group may include material that is security-classified.

Related Records: Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas in General Records of the Department of State, RG 59. Records of Headquarters U.S. Forces, European Theater, and its successor, Headquarters European Command Headquarters U.S. Forces in Austria General Headquarters U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, and its successor, Headquarters Far East Command Headquarters U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific and Headquarters Ryukyus Command and its successors, Headquarters Philippines- Ryukyus Command and Headquarters Ryukyuan Command, all in Records of U.S. Army Commands, 1942- , RG 338.

260.2 Records of the U.S. Group Control Council, Germany (USGCC)

History: Established as an organization of Headquarters European Theater of Operations, U.S. Army (HQ ETOUSA), by General Order 80, HQ ETOUSA, August 9, 1944, implementing a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) message to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), August 5, 1944. So named in anticipation of the organization's becoming the U.S. element of the staff of a control council, consisting of the commanders-in-chief of the U.S., British, and Soviet occupying forces, that would administer occupied Germany during the immediate postwar period. By same general order, Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham was appointed to head USGCC, with title of acting deputy to the chief U.S. representative (not yet named) on the future control council. Effective April 17, 1945, Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay was appointed Deputy Military Governor to succeed Gen. Wickersham as head of USGCC. USGCC functioned, May 8-October 1, 1945, as the agency of the first Military Governor, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who served concurrently as Commanding General ETOUSA (to July 1, 1945) and Commanding General U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET, successor to ETOUSA, from July 1, 1945). In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, signed by U.S., United Kingdom, and USSR representatives, November 14, 1944, and amended to add France as the fourth occupying power, May 1, 1945, Control Council formally established by Section II-A of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference (also known as the Potsdam Conference), August 1, 1945. USGCC abolished, with functions transferred to newly established Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) [OMGUS], October 1, 1945. See 260.3.

Related Records: Historical records of USGCC in records of the Historical Branch of the Control Office, OMGUS, described UNDER 260.3.5. Papers, 1945-49, of Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Deputy U.S. Military Governor, Germany (1945-47), and U.S. Military Governor, Germany (1947-49) in National Archives collection of donated materials selected documents from the papers in Jean Edward Smith, ed., The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay: Germany, 1945- 1949, 2 vols. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1974). Transcripts of oral history interviews of Gen. Clay in Hoover, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Libraries. Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, RG 466.

260.2.1 General records

Textual Records: Decimal correspondence, 1944-45. Daily journal, May-October 1945. Minutes of staff meetings, July 28, 1944- September 29, 1945. Microfilm copy of the Military Governor's reports, July-September 1945 (combined with Military Governor's reports, October-December 1945, 2 rolls). Records of the meetings and activities of the Combined Deputy Military Governors, 1945. Planning records, 1944-45, including records concerning immediate actions to be taken in the event of a German surrender (Project Eclipse) records dealing with the occupation role to be played by the British and staff studies on demilitarization, disarmament, and paramilitary organizations. Policy records, including files of JCS and Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) issuances concerning Germany, 1944-45 and a digest of military government policies set forth in JCS and European Advisory Commission (EAC see 260.2.2) directives ("Policy Book"), 1945.

Microfilm Publications: M1075.

260.2.2 Records in USGCC custody relating to the European
Advisory Commission (EAC)

History: EAC established, with seat in London, by a secret protocol signed by U.S., United Kingdom, and USSR representatives at the Tripartite Conference in Moscow, November 1, 1943, with responsibility for making recommendations to the three Allied governments on questions connected with the termination of the war in Europe. Provisional Government of the French Republic accepted into membership, November 27, 1944. EAC's 12 recommended formal agreements, all of which were eventually accepted by all member governments, concerned surrender terms for, and postwar administration of, Germany and Austria and armistice terms for Bulgaria. EAC abolished, September 10, 1945, pursuant to Section I of the Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference (also known as the Potsdam Conference), August 1, 1945. By Sections I and II of same protocol, responsibility for drawing up peace treaties with the former European Axis powers vested in a Council of Foreign Ministers of China, France, United Kingdom, United States, and USSR and responsibility for administering occupied Germany vested in Control Council.

Textual Records: Decimal correspondence and a subject file, 1943- 45, of Brig. Gens. Cornelius W. Wickersham and Vincent Meyer, successive military advisers to John G. Winant, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom, in his capacity as U.S. member of EAC. Minutes of EAC meetings, 1944-45. File of draft EAC directives, with related memorandums and opinions, maintained by Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, political adviser attached to SHAEF, 1944-45. Subject file concerning EAC directives, maintained by the Legal Advice Branch, 1944-45.

260.3 Records of the Executive Office of the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) [OMGUS]
1943-49 (bulk 1945-49)

History: For a history of OMGUS predecessor, the U.S. Group Control Council, Germany (USGCC), SEE 260.2. OMGUS established, effective October 1, 1945, by General Order 283, HQ USFET, October 8, 1945, implementing USFET letter AG 014.1 GEC-AGO, September 26, 1945. Responsible for administering U.S. zone of occupation and U.S. sector of Berlin, and for functioning as U.S. element of organizations comprising the Allied Control Authority, the name given to the four-power occupation control system. OMGUS functioned, October 1, 1945-September 1, 1949, as the agent of the following successive Military Governors: Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower (concurrently Commanding General USFET), October 1- November 10, 1945 Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. (acting concurrently acting Commanding General USFET), November 11-25, 1945 Gen. Joseph T. McNarney (concurrently Commanding General USFET), November 26, 1945-January 5, 1947 Gen. Lucius D. Clay (concurrently Commanding General USFET, January 6-March 14, 1947 and Commanding General European Command [EUCOM], successor to USFET, from March 15, 1947), January 6, 1947-May 14, 1949 and Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner (acting concurrently acting Commanding General EUCOM), May 15-September 1, 1949. Transition from military to civilian occupation administration initiated by Presidential appointment of John J. McCloy as U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (USHCG), announced May 18, 1949, and establishment in the Department of State of that position by EO 10062, June 6, 1949. McCloy assumed duties, September 2, 1949. OMGUS organizations progressively abolished, with functions transferred to USHCG organizations, June-September 1949. Transition completed by September 21, 1949, date of the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. OMGUS formally abolished, effective December 5, 1949, by General Order 108, Headquarters EUCOM, December 1, 1949.

Related Records: See Related Records under 260.2 for papers and oral history interviews of Gen. Lucius D. Clay. Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, RG 466.

260.3.1 Records of the Office of the Chief of Staff

Textual Records: Subject file, 1945-49. Official files, 1945-47, of Maj. Gen. Frank Keating, Assistant Deputy Military Governor (1946-47). Official files, 1944-48, of Brig. Gen. Charles K. Gailey, Jr., Chief of Staff (1946-49). Files of miscellaneous records concerning occupation policies and problems, 1947-49. Minutes and memorandums, 1949, of the Interdivisional Reorientation Committee, established, 1948, to plan and implement a U.S.-German cultural exchange program.

260.3.2 Correspondence maintained by the Adjutant General's

Textual Records: Formerly security-classified and unclassified decimal correspondence, 1945-49, with partial microfilm copy (97 rolls). Formerly security-classified incoming messages, 1946-49, and outgoing messages, 1946-48. Microfilm copies of summaries of telephone conferences ("Telecons") between the staff of the Military Governor and various officials in Washington, DC, 1947- 49 (10 rolls).

260.3.3 Issuances maintained by the Adjutant General's Office

Textual Records: Numbered internal administrative issuances, with related records, 1945-49. Military government issuance case files, arranged by Control Council (CC) law number, 1945-48 CC directive number, 1945-49 OMGUS law number, 1945-49 OMGUS proclamation number, 1945-48 OMGUS ordinance number, 1945-49 and OMGUS regulation number, 1945-49.

260.3.4 Other records maintained by the Adjutant General's Office

Textual Records: Microfilm copy of the Military Governor's reports, October-December 1945 (combined with Military Governor's reports, July-September 1945, 2 rolls). Records relating to the council comprised of German nationals representing the states under U.S. occupation, known as the Council of States (L"nderrat), including correspondence with the council and its directorate, 1945-49 minutes of council meetings, 1945-47 and records concerning laws proposed by the council, 1945-47. Minutes and related records of a meeting of the U.S., British, French, and Soviet military governors of Germany to discuss issues resulting from the Soviet blockade of the western zones of Berlin ("Four Governors Conference Records"), August-September 1948. Reference file of intelligence reports from various sources, dealing mainly with activities of the USSR internally, in its satellite countries, and in its zone of occupied Germany, 1945- 49. Reference copies of studies of postwar problems conducted by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 1943-48. Reference copies of published reports of OMGUS organizations concerning denazification, democratization, reparation, and restitution efforts, 1947. Microfilm copy of the German civil law code, n.d. (2 rolls).

Related Records: Additional records concerning the L"nderrat under 260.4.2.

260.3.5 Records of the Control Office

Textual Records: General records, consisting of separate subject files relating to military government administration, 1945-49, and the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1947- 49. Records of the Historical Branch, consisting of administrative records, 1945-49 and a compilation of historical records (209 ft.) of the USGCC (see 260.2), the main and regional headquarters organizations of OMGUS, and various Allied occupation organizations, ca. 1945-49, including a microfilm copy of reports of the Tripartite Nutrition Committee, 1945-47 (1 roll). Records of the Organization and Program Branch, consisting of a subject file, 1945-49 and reference files on military government regulations, 1944-49. Correspondence, reports, and other records of the Reports and Statistics Branch, 1945-49. Records of the Budget and Fiscal Branch relating to contracts and accounts, audits, and budgets, 1944-49.

260.3.6 Records of the Field Information Agency, Technical (FIAT)

Textual Records: Records documenting the organization's mission to oversee the collection of technical, scientific, industrial, and economic information relating to Germany, 1945-47, including decimal correspondence, a subject file, and daily journals.

260.4 Records of Functional Offices and Divisions of OMGUS
1923-51 (bulk 1945-50)

Related Records: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, RG 466.

260.4.1 Records of the Analysis and Research Branch of the Office of the Director of Intelligence

Textual Records: Decimal correspondence, 1945-49. Subject file, 1944-48. Reference collection of miscellaneous reports and publications, 1947-48 and of memorandums, reports, news clippings, messages, and other records, arranged by subject, 1947-49.

260.4.2 Records of the Regional Government Coordinating Office

Textual Records: Main subject file, 1945-48. Records relating to the activities of the L"nderrat, 1945-48. Subject file concerning interzonal and military government liaison officers' meetings, 1945-48.

Related Records: Additional records concerning the L"nderrat under 260.3.4.

260.4.3 Records of the Economics Division

Textual Records: General records, consisting of main decimal correspondence, 1944-49 decimal correspondence of the deputy director, 1947-49 a subject file, 1945-49 records relating to trade and trade agreements, 1947-49 records concerning the Economic Cooperation Administration, 1948-49 and a reference file of published reports, ca. 1945. Correspondence, reports, and other records of the Industry Branch and its Oil and Public Utilities Sections, 1945-49, including a microfilm copy of branch-level correspondence, 1945-49 (8 rolls). Subject file of the Price Control Branch, 1945-49. Records of the Decartelization Branch, including two files of general records, a file of records concerning the Bosch Group of Hesse, and a library of publications on German industries, ca. 1945-49, to which items were added, 1949-51, by successor organizations of the Office of the High Commissioner for Germany case files on German industrial firms (1927-48), compiled 1945-48 reports on various German companies, 1945-47 records relating to the decartelization of the Bosch Group, 1948-49 and correspondence and other records of the I.G. Farben Control Office (1930-48), compiled 1945-48.

260.4.4 Records of the Information Services Division (formerly Public Relations Office)

Textual Records: Subject files of the Office of the Director, 1945-49, and the Office of the Deputy Director, 1948-50. Main decimal correspondence, 1944-49. Correspondence, reports, studies, and other records, ca. 1945-49, of the following branches: Policy and Programming Opinion Surveys Fiscal and Budget Control Press Publication Control Motion Picture Radio and Information Centers and Exhibits.

Photographs (4,848 images): Taken or acquired by the Public Relations Office, showing OMGUS military and civilian personnel, headquarters, and housing and recreational facilities Allied military governors and personnel U.S. Government officials U.S. military awards ceremonies buildings in ruins displaced persons and refugees CARE and other relief programs and military operations during the Berlin airlift, 1943-49 (OMG, MGG).

260.4.5 Records of the Civil Administration Division

Textual Records: General records, including central decimal correspondence, 1945-49 subject correspondence maintained by the Executive Branch, 1945-49 minutes of divisional staff meetings, 1945-49 records relating to alleged Soviet violations of quadripartite agreements, 1945-49 and reports on local elections, 1945-46. Correspondence, messages, reports, case files, and other records, ca. 1945-49, of the following branches: Personnel and Administrative Prisoner of War and Displaced Persons Civil Liberties and Democratization Governmental Structures Public Safety Policy Enforcement and Public Health and Public Welfare.

260.4.6 Records of the Legal Division

Textual Records: General records, including a central subject file, 1945-50 records maintained by the Secretariat, 1945-49 a chronological file, 1945-50 and records of the Reports Office, 1945-49. Correspondence, reports, case files, and other records, 1945-49, of the following branches: Legal Advice Administration of Justice and Prisons.

260.4.7 Records of the Manpower Division

Textual Records: Central subject files, 1945-49. Correspondence, reports, studies, and other records, 1945-49, of the following branches: Labor Relations Social Insurance Labor Management Technique and Manpower Analysis.

260.4.8 Records of the Transportation Division

Textual Records: Central correspondence relating to transportation policy, international transportation, and the activities of various interallied occupation organizations concerned with transportation, 1945-49. Records of the Administrative, Secretariat and Reports, and Technical Supply Sections of the Executive Branch, 1945-49. Subject and reports files of the Reports and Statistics Group, 1945-49. Correspondence, reports, studies, and other records, 1945-49, of the following branches: Movements Rail Inland Water Transport Maritime Ports and Shipping and Highway and Highway Transport.

260.4.9 Records of the Property Division

Textual Records: General records, including a central subject file, 1944-50 and a reports file, 1945-49. Correspondence, case files, reports, and other records of the Property Control and External Assets Branch, 1944-50, and the Reparations and Restitution Branch, 1945-49. Records of, and relating to, centers for the collection of literary, artistic, and other types of alienated property established in various cities in the U.S. occupation zone ("Central Collecting Points," CCP), 1944-51 (bulk 1945-49).

Photographs: Archives, libraries, and castles in 10 German cities, 1946-47 (ACL, 181 images). Photographs taken by the Dresden Art Gallery, presumably as a record of art plundered by the Axis powers ("Linz Collection"), 1940-45 (L, 3,000 images). Postwar collection, storage, and restitution of works of art, accomplished at the Munich CCP, 1945-47 (MP, 1,234 images) and at the Wiesbaden CCP, 1945-50 (WA, WB, WC, WAE, WLA, WLB, and WLC 9,767 images). Famous Germans, and the Hermann G"ring art collection, assembled at the Munich CCP, and restitution of art activities at that location, ca. 1945 (MCCP, 118 images). Activities at the Offenbach Archival Depot of OMGUS, art looted from synagogues, and activities of the Task Force Reich Leader Rosenberg (Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg, "ERR"), in albums, 1946 (PHOAD, 160 images).

Photographs and Postcards: Relating to the Platterhof (former name of the General Walker Hotel) in the then existing village of Obersalzburg, Bavaria, ca. 1923-40 (NS, NSA, 277 images).

Photographs and Photomechanical Reproductions: Portraits of famous Germans, compiled in 1904, n.d. (GP, 30 images).

Photographic Prints: Benedictine abbey at Montecassino, Italy, before and after its destruction by Allied bombing, with restoration plans, in album, 1949 (MC, 51 images). War damage to German monuments and buildings, 1946-47 (DM, 2,100 images). "Ex libris" bookplates, ca. 1946 (XL, 478 images), and library markings from looted books, ca. 1946 (LM, 14,783 images), photographed at the Offenbach Archival Depot. Survey of war damage to historical and cultural monuments in the U.S. zone of occupation, 1947 (DB, 200 images). Scenes from the life of SS- Brig. Gen. Ulrich Graf, in albums, ca. 1937 (NSE, NSF 40 images). Photographic prints dedicated to Professor Seifert, in album, 1942 (NSB, 56 images).

Photographic Negatives: Comprising the Task Force Reich Leader Rosenberg Collection ("ERR Collection"), showing works of art taken from France to Germany by teams acting under the direction of National Socialist ("Nazi") official Alfred Rosenberg, 1940-43 (ERR, 6,710 images). Polish art, ca. 1939 (PC, 27 images). Russian icons, ca. 1945-46 (RT, 34 images). Exhibit held at the Jeu de Paume Museum in Paris, 1943 (JP, 21 images). Engravings in the Berlin Kupferstiche Kabinett, photographed at the Wiesbaden CCP, ca. 1946 (KK, 158 images).

Photomechanical Reproductions: Art sent for temporary safekeeping to the National Gallery of Art in Washington, DC, 1945 (GU, 202 images). Photomechanical reproductions included in a publication on Adolf Hitler's lineage, 1937 (NSD, 32 images) and in a book on Ordensburg in Sonthofen, Bavaria, 1937 (NSC, 19 images).

Related Records: Records of the American Commission for the Protection and Salvage of Artistic and Historic Monuments in War Areas, RG 239.

260.4.10 Records of the Finance Division

Textual Records: General records, consisting of correspondence concerning financial policies and procedures, 1944-48 case files on banks, 1945-47 records of interrogations of Nazi financiers, 1946-47 and a microfilm copy of case files on leading German officials (1933-45), compiled ca. 1945-47 (3 rolls). Subject file of the Financial Institutions Branch, 1945-48. Correspondence and other records of the Office of the Finance Adviser concerning export-import, trade, and financial institution policies, 1945- 49. Correspondence, reports, and other records, 1945-50, of the following groups: Financial Intelligence Internal and External Finance and Foreign Exchange Depository.

260.4.11 Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division

Textual Records: General records, including transcripts of telephone conferences between the Civil Affairs Division of Headquarters USFET/EUCOM and E&CRD officials, 1946-49 records concerning budget and fiscal matters, 1948-49 and records of the Research and Planning Section, 1948-49. Correspondence, messages, reports, studies, and other records, 1945-49, of the following branches: Education Community Education (formerly Group Activities) Religious Affairs and Cultural Affairs.

260.4.12 Records of the Civil Aviation Branch of the Armed Forces Division

Textual Records: Decimal correspondence, 1949-50. Subject file, 1944-50.

260.5 Records of OMGUS Organizations concerned with War Crimes Trials

Related Records: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, RG 466.

260.5.1 Records of the Office of the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (OCCWC)

History: For a history, see 238.4.

Textual Records: Administrative records, 1946-49. Records of the Evidence Division, consisting of case files on defendants and witnesses in Case 6 ("I.G. Farben Case"), heard before a U.S. military tribunal in Nuremberg (1947-48), ca. 1947-48 completed Staff Evidence Analysis (SEA) forms, 1946-48, compiled by the Document Control Branch and interrogation summaries, 1946-48, compiled by the Interrogation Branch. Records of the Special Projects Division relating to its mission to assist ministries of justice in the various German states within the U.S. zone in the conduct of denazification cases, 1947-49. Records of the Publications Division concerning the publication of proceedings of the U.S. military tribunals, 1948-49. Records of the Language Division, 1947-48, consisting of daily trial reports and exemplars of translation tests.

Related Records: Additional records of OCCWC in RG 238, National Archives Collection of World War II War Crimes Records.

260.5.2 Records of the Secretariat for U.S. Military Tribunals

History: For a history, see 238.5.

Textual Records: Records of the Office of the Secretary General, including general correspondence, 1946-49 daily trial summaries, 1947-48 case files of prosecution and defense motions and requests, 1947-49 and clemency petition case files, 1947-49. Defendant and witness case files of the Marshal's Office, 1947- 48. Subject files and administrative records of the Defense Center, 1946-49. Records of the Office of the Director of Printing relating to the publication and distribution of the official trial record, 1945-49.

Related Records: Additional records of the Secretariat for U.S. Military Tribunals in RG 238, National Archives Collection of World War II War Crimes Records.

260.5.3 Records of the Secretariat of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) in the custody of the Secretariat for U.S. Military Tribunals

History: Established by IMT Procedural Rule 8, October 29, 1945, with responsibility for receiving all documents addressed to the IMT, maintaining IMT records, and providing clerical services to IMT. Abolished following the rendering of IMT judgments, September 30 and October 1, 1946, with a residual staff functioning, 1946-49, until completion of the publication of the official record of IMT proceedings, 1949. Official trial records, constituting the Archives of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, were deposited with the International Court of Justice in The Hague, Netherlands.

Textual Records: General records, 1945-46. File of official trial documents in the custody of the IMT President, Lord Justice Geoffrey Lawrence, 1945-46. Copies of exhibits and document books, 1945-46. Records concerning indicted organizations, 1945-46.

Related Records: Records of the Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality in RG 238, National Archives Collection of World War II War Crimes Records.

260.5.4 Other records

Photographic Prints (2,087 images): Made by the Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality from negatives comprising the Task Force Reich Leader Rosenberg Collection ("ERR Collection" see 260.4.9 under Photographic Negatives), 1945 (ERRA).

Related Records: Records of Task Force Reich Leader Rosenberg in RG 242, National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized. Records of the Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality in RG 238, National Archives Collection of World War II War Crimes Records.

260.6 Records of Berlin Command, OMGUS

Textual Records: Central decimal correspondence, 1946-48. Subject file, 1947-48. File of endorsements sent, 1947-48. Incoming messages, January-April 1948. Outgoing messages, 1946-48. Unit reports of operations, compiled by the Historical Division, 1947- 48. Special court martial-case files, compiled by the Staff Judge Advocate, 1947-48. Fragmentary records of the Engineer Division, Signal Division, 7782d Special Troop Battalion, Motor Transport Battalion, and Berlin Barter Center, 1946-48.

Related Records: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, RG 466.

260.7 Records of State (Land) and Sector Military Governments Responsible to OMGUS
1945-51 (bulk 1945-49)

Related Records: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, RG 466.

260.7.1 Records of the Office of Military Government, Bavaria

Textual Records: Records of the Office of the Land Director, including separate correspondence files of the Director, Assistant Director, and Deputy Director, 1947-49 central decimal correspondence, 1945-49 a subject file, 1946-48 correspondence and other records relating to investigations, 1945-49 issuances, 1945-49 incoming and outgoing messages, 1945-49 and reports, 1945-49. Correspondence, messages, case files, reports, and other records, 1945-51 (bulk 1945-49), of the following divisions: Intelligence Economics Manpower Finance Legal Education and Cultural Relations Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Property Civil Administration and Information Services. Correspondence, messages, and other records of the Transportation Branch, 1945- 49. Records of the Field Operations Division, including headquarters records, 1947-49 and records, 1946-50, of Branches A (Würzburg), B (Ansbach), D (Regensburg), E (Munich), and G (Augsburg), together with records of each branch's subordinate Resident Liaison and Security Offices, located in each district (Landkreis).

Posters (1 item): "Stalin an das Deutsche Volk," from correspondence of the Land Director, ca. 1949.

260.7.2 Records of the Office of Military Government, Hesse

Textual Records: Subject correspondence maintained by the Executive Office, 1946-48, with partial microfilm copy (1 roll). Correspondence, reports, and issuances of the Hesse Section, 7780th OMGUS Group, 1945-49. Correspondence, messages, reports, and other records, 1945-49, of the following divisions: Personnel Historical and Field Reports Public Information Intelligence Bipartite Liaison Education and Cultural Relations Legal Civil Administration Information Services and Property. Records of the Liaison and Security Control Division, consisting of headquarters records, 1946-49 and records of Liaison and Security Offices, together with their suboffices, in the following districts: Wiesbaden, Frankfurt, Darmstadt, Wetzlar, Giessen, Marburg, Fulda, Fritzlar-Homberg, and Kassel. Correspondence and other records of the State Seizure Association (Staatliche Erfassungsgesellschaft, "STEG"), 1945-48, relating to its mission to seize and operate factories as necessary to ensure Germany's economic survival and eventual recovery. Subject file of the Wiesbaden regional office of the U.S. Customs Group, 1949.

260.7.3 Records of the Office of Military Government, Württemberg-Baden

Textual Records: General records, including central correspondence, 1945-49 subject correspondence, 1945-49 issuances, 1945-49 a file of speeches, press conferences, and news releases, 1945-50 financial records, 1948-50 and reports of military government detachments, 1945-47. Correspondence, messages, reports, and other records, 1945-49, of the following divisions: Government Affairs Information Service Education and Cultural Relations Legal Economics Property Intelligence Fiscal and Transportation. Records of the Field Relations Division (formerly Field Operations Group), including records of headquarters, 1945-49 and records, 1945-49, of the Resident Liaison and Security Office in each district (Landkreis).

260.7.4 Records of the Office of Military Government, Bremen

Textual Records: General records, including central subject files, 1945-49 incoming messages, 1946-48 issuances, 1946-49 and reports, 1945-47. Correspondence, messages, reports, and other records, 1945-49, of the following divisions: Information Control Finance Legal Public Health and Welfare Denazification Manpower Public Safety Education Civil Administration Economics Transport and Waterfront. Records of the Public Information Office, including correspondence, 1947-48 monthly activity reports of other offices, divisions, and branches, 1948-49 and quarterly and annual histories of military government in Bremen, 1945-48. Records of the Bremerhaven Liaison and Security Detachment, including decimal and subject correspondence, 1945-49 reading files of the director, 1947-49 records relating to housing, the fishing industry, and clubs and youth activities, 1945-49 and records of the Special Branch concerning denazification activities, 1945-49.

260.7.5 Records of the Office of Military Government, Berlin Sector

Textual Records: Subject correspondence, 1945-49. U.S. airlift reports, 1948-49, with microfilm copy (8 rolls). British airlift reports, 1948-49. Microfilm copy of orders to the mayor of Berlin, May-September 1949 (1 roll) activity reports, 1947-48 (7 rolls) and Berlin press reviews and releases, 1947-48 (12 rolls). Records of the Civil Administration and Political Affairs Branch, including a central subject file, 1945-49 minutes of meetings of the City Assembly of Greater Berlin, 1948-49, with partial microfilm copy (6 rolls) and microfilm copies of special reports, 1947-48 (1 roll), and weekly political reports, January- October 1948 (2 rolls). Correspondence, messages, reports, and other records, 1945-49, of the following other branches: Information Services Education and Cultural Relations Public Health Public Welfare Manpower Legal Economics Communications Finance Property Control Public Works and Utilities and Public Safety.

260.8 Records of U.S. Elements of Allied Control Authority (ACA) Organizations (Germany)
1944-53 (bulk 1945-48)

Related Records: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, RG 466.

260.8.1 General records

Textual Records: Central file, arranged numerically, 1945-49, with subject index. Microfilm copy of Control Council and Coordinating Committee status reports, 1945-48 (1 roll). Administrative records of the U.S. element of the Allied Secretariat, 1945-48.

260.8.2 Records of the U.S. element of the Control Council

Textual Records: General records, 1945-48. "Master File," 1945- 46.

260.8.3 Records of the U.S. element of the Coordinating Committee

Textual Records: General records, 1945-48. "Master File," 1945- 48. Minutes, 1945-48. Miscellaneous records, 1946-53.

260.8.4 Records of U.S. elements of ACA directorates

Textual Records: General records of U.S. elements of the Combined Services Directorate and its predecessors, the Air, Military, and Naval Directorates, 1945-48, with partial microfilm copies, 1945- 47 (66 rolls). General records of U.S. elements of the Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Directorate, 1945-48, and its subordinate organization, the Combined Repatriation Executive, 1945-49. General records of the U.S. element of the Combined Services and Economic Directorate, 1947. General records, 1945- 49, of U.S. elements of the following other directorates: Legal Internal Affairs and Communications Economic Financial Reparations, Deliveries, and Restitution Transport Manpower and Political.

260.8.5 Records of U.S. elements of other ACA organizations

Textual Records: General records of the U.S. element of the German External Property Commission, 1945-48. Records of the U.S. element of the Committee on Allied Controls, 1944-49. Subject file of the U.S. element of the Allied Kommandatura [quadripartite controlling body for Berlin], 1945-49. Memorandums of the U.S. element of the Divisional Legislative Review Board, 1949.

260.9 Records of U.S. Elements of Combined U.S.-British organizations (Germany)
1943-51 (bulk 1945-49)

Related Records: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, RG 466.

260.9.1 Records of the U.S. element of the Bipartite Board

Textual Records: General records, 1947-49, dealing with the board's policy-making activities for the unified economy of the U.S. and British zones of occupation. Minutes of BIB meetings, with agendas and related background papers, 1949. Records concerning the various bipartite organizations, 1947-49.

260.9.2 Records of the Office of the U.S. Chairman of the Bipartite Control Office ("BICO")

Textual Records: Subject file, 1947-50. File of treaties and trade agreements, 1947-50.

260.9.3 General records of the U.S. element of BICO

Textual Records: Decimal, subject, and subject-numeric correspondence, 1947-49. Reading file, 1948-49. Reports, memorandums, minutes, and other records of the U.S. economic adviser, 1947-49. Minutes of meetings of BICO staff members with bizonal and German officials, 1947-49. Records relating to bipartite participation in the European Recovery Program, 1947- 49. Reference collection on bipartite organizations and activities, maintained by the BICO Library, 1946-49.

260.9.4 Records of U.S. elements of BICO staff organizations

Textual Records: Correspondence, reports, memorandums, and other records, 1945-50 (bulk 1947-49), of the following bipartite control groups: Civil Service Commerce and Industry Communications Finance Food, Agriculture, and Forestry Legal and U.S. Customs.

260.9.5 Records of U.S. elements of other bipartite organizations

Textual Records: Records of the Joint Export-Import Agency, consisting of records concerning payment and trade agreements, arranged by country, 1946-50 records relating to military government accounts, 1943-49 records relating to advances and payments, 1946-50 and minutes of meetings and other records of the Joint Export Import Board, 1947-49. Subject files of the U.S. element of the Allied Bank Commission, 1948-51.

260.10 Records of U.S. Elements of Combined U.S.-British-French Organizations (Germany)

Textual Records: General records, 1948-49. Progress reports, 1948-49. Records of tripartite meetings, 1948-49. Minutes and related records of the Committee of Deputies of the Military Security Board, March-June 1949.

Related Records: Records of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, RG 466.

260.11 Records of the U.S., Allied Commission for Austria (USACA) Section of Headquarters U.S. Forces in Austria
1932-56 (bulk 1945-50)

Note: Presently allocated to this record group, but not part of the records of the USACA Section, are records of other organizations of Headquarters U.S. Forces in Austria (HQ USFA), including records of the Historical Division, ca. 1945-50 (16 ft.) and war crimes case files maintained by the Judge Advocate Section, ca. 1945-50 (5 ft.).

History: USACA Section, responsible for civil affairs/military government administration, was organized concurrently with the establishment of HQ USFA by General Order 1, HQ USFA, July 5, 1945, as a component of U.S. Forces, European Theater (USFET). The single position of Commanding General USFA and U.S. High Commissioner for Austria was held successively by Gen. Mark W. Clark, July 5, 1945-May 16, 1947 and Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, May 17, 1947-September 19, 1950. USACA Section provided the U.S. element of organizations comprising the Allied Commission for Austria, the name of the four-power occupation administration established by a U.S., British, French, and Soviet agreement, signed July 4, 1945, and made effective July 24, 1945. USACA Section also administered occupation government in U.S. zone of Austria and U.S. sector of Vienna. USACA Section abolished following transfer of U.S. occupation government from military to civilian authority, marked by the Presidential appointment of Walter J. Donnelly as Envoy (later, Ambassador) to Austria and U.S. High Commissioner for Austria, effective September 20, 1950. Donnelly succeeded by Ambassador Llewelyn E. Thompson, Jr., July 17, 1952. U.S. occupation government in Austria officially terminated, July 27, 1955, date of the entrance into force of the State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria, signed May 15, 1955.

260.11.1 General records

Textual Records: Correspondence and other records of the Office of the Chief (prior to March 1950, Office of the Director), 1946- 51. Central decimal correspondence, 1945-51. Records of various organizations of the Allied Commission for Austria, maintained by USACA, ca. 1945-50. Final report of the High Commissioner, 1950.

260.11.2 Records of component organizations

Textual Records: Records of general and special staff sections, 1944-56, including reports, intelligence summaries, and investigative files of the G-2 (Intelligence) Section. General records of the Information Branch and subordinate sections, 1945-50 and the Statistical Analysis Branch, 1945-50. Correspondence, reports, case files, and other records of the Monuments and Fine Arts, German External Assets, and Property Control Branches of the Reparations, Deliveries, and Restitution Division, 1932-51 (bulk 1945-51). General records, 1945-50, of the following components of the Internal Affairs and Displaced Persons Division: the Internal Affairs Branch and its Public Safety and Denazification Sections and the Displaced Persons Branch. Records of the Legal Division, consisting of administrative records, 1945-50 and records of general, summary, and intermediate courts sitting in Linz, Salzburg, Vienna, and other localities, 1945-55. Records of the Education Division, consisting of general records, 1945-50 and records relating to youth activities, 1946-51. General records of the Welfare and Relief Branch of the Social Administration Division, 1945-50. Central decimal correspondence maintained by the Adjutant General Section, 1946-47. Records of the Vienna Area Command, including central correspondence, issuances, and other general records maintained by the Adjutant General Section, 1946- 48 and miscellaneous records, 1946-48. Records of military detachments, maintained by the Military and Naval Divisions, 1946-51. General records of the following other divisions: Air, 1945-51 Civilian Supply, 1946-50 Finance, 1945- 50 Economic, 1944-50 Transport, 1945-50 and Communications, 1945-50.

Map: Town plan of Gmunden, Austria, 1947 (1 item).

260.12 Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (USCAR)

History: Following signing of the Instrument of Surrender, September 2, 1945, Ryukyu Islands were administered by Department of the Navy, September 21, 1945-June 30, 1946, with Commanding Officer, Naval Operating Base, Okinawa functioning as chief military government officer under authority of Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet. Transfer of administration from Department of the Navy to War Department authorized by Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approval, April 1, 1946, of JCS 819/11, March 5, 1946, with added proviso of JCS 819/12, March 22, 1946. Pursuant to implementing instructions of General Headquarters U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (GHQ AFPAC), Okinawa Base Command redesignated Ryukyus Command, effective July 1, 1946, by General Order 162, Headquarters U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific, and made responsible for administration under a Deputy Commander for Military Government. Ryukyu Islands administered successively by Ryukyus Command, July 1-November 30, 1946 Philippines-Ryukyus Command, December 1, 1946-July 31, 1948 and Ryukyuan Command, August 1, 1948-December 15, 1950. USCAR established, effective December 15, 1950, by a directive of Headquarters Far East Command (HQ FEC, formerly GHQ AFPAC), AG 091.1 (5 Dec 50) RCA, December 5, 1950, implementing a JCS memorandum, SM 2474-50, October 11, 1950, directing Commander-in-Chief Far East, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, to organize a civil administration for the Ryukyu Islands in accordance with JCS 1231/14, October 4, 1950. USCAR continued to function under Department of the Army (formerly War Department), 1950-71. Amami Island Group of Ryukyu Islands was returned to Japan by the Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Amami Islands, signed December 24, 1953, and made effective December 25, 1953. USCAR abolished following entrance into force, May 15, 1972, of the Agreement between the United States of America and Japan concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, signed June 17, 1971, by which the remaining island groups of the Ryukyu Islands, including the Okinawa Island Group, were returned to Japan.

260.12.1 Records of the Office of the High Commissioner

Textual Records: Correspondence, minutes and notes of meetings, translations, and other records of the Language Aide, 1960-69. Records of the Information Coordinator concerning the various staff departments, 1969-71. Records of the Advisory Committee to the High Commissioner, containing the committee's recommendations for action on social, economic, and related matters, 1968-70. Records of the U.S. element of the Preparatory Commission concerning reversion of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, 1970-71.

260.12.2 Records maintained by the Administrative Office of the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: Central correspondence ("General Administrative Files"), 1962-71. Record sets of issuances, 1950-59. Historical and organization planning files, 1956-70.

260.12.3 Records of the Comptroller Department of the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: General correspondence, 1965-72. Records concerning budget formulation and execution, 1967-71 general fund program formulation, 1966-71 economic aid, 1967-71 general accounting, 1956-68 petroleum distribution accounting and management, 1956-71 local government budget guidance, 1960-71 and customs management, 1967-71.

260.12.4 Records of the Economic Department of the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: "Common Mission Files," 1956-70. Records concerning banking facilities, 1957-71 the Bank of Ryukyu, 1959- 71 and the Development Loan Corporation, 1961-71.

260.12.5 Records of the Health, Education and Welfare Department of the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: General records, including legal and liaison files, 1965-71 records containing local government budget guidance, 1964-71 narcotics input control and reports files, 1963-71 records concerning communicable diseases, 1964-71 and records concerning preventive medicine, veterinary medicine, and sanitation activities, 1960-71. Project files of the Welfare Division, 1964-71. General records, 1964-71, of the Health Division the Education Division and the English Language Center.

260.12.6 Records of the Labor Department of the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: General correspondence, 1958-71. Civil affairs planning files, 1968-71. Records relating to employment control, 1958-71 labor council management, 1958-71 and social insurance, 1953-71.

260.12.7 Records of the Legal Affairs Department of the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: Records of the Legal Division, including policy and precedent files, 1952-71 legislation and legislative background files, 1952-68 English-language translations of Government of the Ryukyu Islands laws, 1953-71 and claims files, 1961-71. Records of the Land Division, including general correspondence, 1953-71 case files, 1955-71 records relating to municipalities, 1946-47 land conference files, 1958 records concerning Okinawa land problems, 1955-58 and South American emigration and resettlement files, 1960-70.

260.12.8 Records of the Liaison Department of the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: General correspondence, 1945-71. "Common Mission Files," 1952-71. Records, 1952-71, concerning special projects and international relations.

260.12.9 Records of the Public Affairs Department of the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: Central correspondence, 1966-71. Program records of the Cultural Affairs Division, 1964-71. Records of the Information Division, including program records, 1964-71 record sets of publications, 1952-70 press books, 1965-69 and "News Morgue Files," 1958-71.

Motion Pictures: Newsreels produced by the Information Division, depicting historical events, personalities, ceremonial events, and social and economic activities in the Ryukyu Islands, 1958-71 (2,185 reels).

Sound Recordings: Japanese-language sound track for some of the newsreels produced by the Information Division, n.d. (2 items).

Photographic Prints: Political, economic, social, and cultural life in the Ryukyu Islands under USCAR, including political parties and elections, industries, schools and universities, ceremonial events, and visits by dignitaries from the United States and other countries, 1949-72 (CR, 35,100 images). USCAR activities, and social and cultural programs, in albums, 1964-65 (CRA, 2,300 images).

260.12.10 Records of the Public Safety Department of the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: Records of the Operations Division, including general correspondence, 1968-71 reports of incidents involving U.S. military personnel, 1968-71 police liaison files, 1967-71 records concerning emergency planning, 1952-71 records relating to civic action, 1966-71 and records containing local government guidance, 1967-71. Records of the Immigration Division relating to entry and exit control, 1958-71 and family registration, 1958-71.

260.12.11 Records of the Public Works Department of the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: General correspondence, 1963-71. Project review files, 1965-71. Records containing guidance on local construction and maintenance, 1964-71. Records concerning water and electric power control, transportation services, communications, and postage stamp development, 1952-71.

260.12.12 Records of civil affairs teams responsible to the Office of the Civil Administrator

Textual Records: Civil affairs files, 1969-71, of the Miyako and the Yaeyama Civil Affairs Teams.

Bibliographic note: Web version based on Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States. Compiled by Robert B. Matchette et al. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1995.
3 volumes, 2428 pages.

This Web version is updated from time to time to include records processed since 1995.

VIII. Japanese-Language Sources

Sakamoto Yoshikazu, et al., Nihon senryô bunken mokuroku (Tokyo: Nihon Gakujutsu Shinkôkai, 1972). REF Z3308.A5 N54 1972.

This bibliography on the Allied occupation of Japan is the companion volume of Robert Ward and Frank Shulman's Annotated Bibliography of Western Language Materials . It is a complete and annotated guide that treats the literature of the occupation in Japanese that appeared through the end of 1971. The items described are all in Japanese but the format is essentially the same as the Annotated Bibliography, as the two-volume series was initiated, planned, and carried out jointly by Japanese and American scholars. The main difference is that this Japanese-language companion does not include bibliographical sources on prewar and postwar periods.

Not every item listed is annotated, but those that do are considered by the editors to be particularly significant materials, or they may be difficult to surmise their content without some sort of explanation. Most of the nearly 3,000 entries were compiled from three main sources, Zen Nippon shuppanbutsu sômokuroku, Zasshi kiji sôin, Nôhon shžhô, all published by the National Diet Library. Each entry, listed in alphabetical order, notes the publisher, year of publication, number of pages, name of library where the publication can be found, and whether or not one can borrow the particular resource. The subject matter is categorized and divided into seven chapters, including "general materials," "politics and governing system," "economy," "labor and society," "education," "media," and "religion." Most sources are in libraries in and around Tokyo, with a large proportion physically housed in the National Diet Library. Although this bibliography may be a dated resource, it is still an impressive compilation and is the best available tool for researching occupation sources in the Japanese language.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nippon senryô j û yô bunsho (Documents Concerning the Allied Occupation and Control of Japan), v. 1 - 6 (Tokyo: Nippon Tosho Center, 1989). DS 889. A15 1989.

This series is a reprinted edition of the original publication by the Special Records Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The original volumes 1 through 4 were published between 1949 and 1950 while volumes 5 and 6 were subsequently published in 1977. This new edition is a compilation of a wide range of political, military, cultural, and economic aspects of the occupation-related official documents, categorized according to subject matter and in chronological order. Many of the documents that were compiled were memorandums sent from the GHQ to the Japanese government, but there are also speeches and letters written by the Supreme Commander, official announcements by the GHQ, and even includes policy decisions by the Far East Commission and official documents from the United States government. In this way, it is fair to say that it is a comprehensive compilation of official documents that were made available to the Japanese government at the time of the occupation.

What is important to keep in mind here is that this is not only a compilation of commands that were sent to the Japanese government during the time of its occupation, but also the fact that all of these documents were translated, edited and published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time. In this sense, it is a valuable source that represents the process of implementing democratization, demilitarization, and other occupation policies as recorded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The six volumes are divided as "Basic Documents," "Political, Military and Cultural," "Financial, Economic & Reparations," "Commercial and Industrial," "On Civil Property," and "On Aliens," the last two volumes of which are an explanation of revised Japanese laws which were translated to English. Some of the earlier directives issued by SCAP and official documents such as the "United States Initial Post-surrender Policy for Japan" were translated into formal bungo script mixed with kata kana and are difficult to read, but every document in Japanese is accompanied by the original text in English on the opposite page.

Etô Jun, Senryô shiroku , v. 1--4 (Tokyo: Kôdansha , 1989). DS 889.16.S46 1989.

This four-volume series is a compilation of the "Sengo kiroku" (Post-war Records) made public by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1976 and 1978. Volume 1 consists of official documents of the period from which Japan was considering the terms of unconditional surrender to the official surrender ceremony on September 2, 1945, as well as the documents related to the initial terms of the Allied occupation. The second volume covers documents concerning Japan's cease-fire agreement and demobilization of its presence throughout Asia, the removal of leadership involved in the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere, as well as termination of Japan's diplomatic rights. The third volume consists of documents related to the revision of the Imperial Constitution. The last volume is a compilation of documents concerning the military occupation of Japan, both at the national and regional levels. The forward to the series notes that most of these documents were unpublished until Kôdansha undertook this project.

Although most of the retransmitted documents are true to its originals, the editor has included helpful footnotes to provide supplemental information. In addition, each volume begins with an introductory article or interview by a Japanese scholar or a former American occupation official, and ends with a commentary written by the editor. These are useful in so far as they help to contextualize the subject matter of each volume. This pocket-size series also contains frequent maps and charts that makes what could at times be dry reading more visually entertaining.

Yamagiwa Akira and Nakamura Masanori, Shiryô nihon senryô , v. 1 - 2 (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1990). DS 889.16.S54 1990.

The first volume entitled Tennôsei is a compilation of primary sources that have been translated into Japanese concerning the treatment of the emperor system by the Allied powers. Although the sources examined here are mainly official policy documents and reports of various U.S. government agencies, non-official sources in English, as well as in Japanese, Chinese, and Russian are also provided as supplementary material. For example, the chapter on "Debates Within and Outside of the United States Concerning the Emperor System" includes editorials from the New York Times and the San Francisco Chronicle , speeches and interviews by Generals Chiang Kai-shek and Joseph Stalin, and journal articles by other prominent political figures from the Allied powers.

The structure of this volume is divided into wartime sources and postwar sources, each section containing three chapters according to a specific subject, and the documents contained in each chapter are organized in chronological order. The three chapters in the section on wartime sources (December, 1942-September, 1945) are "Examination of the Emperor System by the U.S. State Department," "Debates Within and Outside of the United States Concerning the Emperor System," and "Unconditional Surrender and the Emperor System." The three chapters in the section on postwar sources are "The Problem of War Crimes by the Emperor," "Treatment of the Emperor System," and "Occupation Policy and the Emperor System." Since some of the wartime sources, and much of the postwar sources are State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and State Department reports, the bibliography at the end of this volume is most helpful in identifying these government record groups and where they come from. The footnotes accompanying each document also provide helpful information to the reader who might be unfamiliar with the background of the subject and terminology in question.

The second volume entitled Rôdô kaikaku to rôdô und ô , published in 1992, is currently not available at Starr Library.

E. H. Norman, Nippon senryô no kiroku : 1946-48, translated by Nakano Toshiko, (Tokyo: Jimbun Shoin, 1997). DS 889.16.N66 1997.

E.H. Norman, primarily known as a Japanese historian, was a Canadian diplomat in Tokyo during the occupation. From 1946 to 1950, part of his job as the head of the Canadian delegation to the Allied occupation entailed dispatching letters, reports, and other official documents to the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From this mass of documentation, the editor of this book has selected 60 reports from 1946 to 1948, and has translated and added extensive explanatory notes to these otherwise unpublished records, so as to shed some light on Norman's observations of occupied Japan.

What is of interest to the reader is that this book provides a comparatively objective account of the events of the occupation as seen through the eyes of E. H. Norman. There are two factors that account for the author's ability to see things more objectively. One is that, as the Canadian government representative of the Allied powers in occupied Japan, Norman had free access to the General Headquarters of SCAP, the Far East Commission, and Japan's governmental as well as non-governmental organizations. For all practical purposes, Canada was not really an occupying power it had neither the power nor responsibility in the administration of the occupation. In this regard, Norman was in a unique position to observe first hand Japan's transition in the immediate postwar years, and from a perspective more detached than the primary actor in the occupation--the United States. Secondly, the author himself is the focus of this book. As a diplomat and historian who lived for a long time in Japan before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Norman had greater insight in evaluating the various facets of wide-ranging and fundamental social transformations of postwar Japan.

This book is not a comprehensive bibliography of E.H. Norman's observations of occupied Japan, but deals with the most outstanding reform measures that were carried out in the first three years of the occupation. The editor's notes on the bottom of each page is very helpful in contextualizing Norman's reports. The biographical reference, the timeline of the occupation, and the document list of Norman's reports at the back of the book are also useful. It would, of course, be easiest to read this all in English, but the original documentation is only available in the National Archives of Canada.

Rinjiro Sodei, Correspondence Between General MacArthur, Prime Minister Yoshida and Other High Japanese Officials (1945-1951) (Tokyo: Hosei University Press, 2000). DS 889.16.Y67 2000.

As the title suggests, this book is a compilation of correspondence between General Douglas MacArthur and the Japan's three leading Prime Ministers during the occupation--Yoshida Shigeru, Katayama Tetsu, Ashida Hitoshi. The texts are provided in both the English-language originals and the Japanese translations. Preceding the texts is a 100-page commentary on what the author calls "correspondence diplomacy." which helps to explain the process by which General MacArthur communicated SCAP's occupation policies and reform program to the heads of the Japanese government. The author's narrative puts the documents in context, while the documents themselves are invaluable primary sources that shed some light on how the occupier and the occupied felt about specific measures of reforming Japanese state and society. The fact that these letters of correspondence were not official documents in a strict sense gives the reader a rare glimpse into the minds of the highest officials involved in the Allied occupation of Japan.

This book makes available crucial historical documents concerning not only the relationship of SCAP and General MacArthur to Japan's key prime ministers during the occupation, but also the relationship of those government leaders to the issues of democracy that was so divisive to the contemporary popular movements and the old-guard elites. It deserves, therefore, to be on any meaningful list of bibliographical sources on occupation literature. The letters of correspondence have been gathered mainly from the MacArthur Memorial Library, the Prange Collection, and the National Archives.

American Experience

Emperor Hirohito and General MacArthur, at their first meeting, at the U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 27 September, 1945. U.S. Army.

The Japanese Occupation (1945-1951)
On the morning of September 8, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur made his way by automobile toward the American Embassy in the heart of Tokyo. One American observer described it as a city "completely flat with destruction," where even "the rubble did not look like much." As he presided over a ceremony at the Embassy -- his home for the next five and a half years -- MacArthur ordered General Eichelberger to "have our country's flag unfurled, and in Tokyo's sun let it wave in its full glory as a symbol of hope for the oppressed and as a harbinger of victory for the right." This moment was not broadcast throughout the world as the surrender ceremony aboard the U.S.S. Missouri had been six days earlier. Yet in hindsight, it was just as symbolic of the occupation period to follow: optimistic, thoroughly American, and unmistakably MacArthur.

Although the occupation was nominally an allied enterprise -- MacArthur's title was Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, or SCAP -- it was very much an American show, and there was no doubt who was in charge. As historian Michael Schaller has noted, "From its inception, the occupation became synonymous with its supreme commander. Although few Americans could name the man in charge of the German occupation (General Lucius Clay and, later, John J. McCloy) most could readily identify the top man in Tokyo." In fact, most of the basic principles and policies for the occupation were drawn up by planners in Washington in the last two years of the war (and are contained in a document known as SWNCC 228). While the impression that MacArthur was behind everything that happened in Japan far exceeds the reality, he deserves a great deal of credit for what most people agree was a highly successful occupation. Initiating some policies and skillfully implementing many others, MacArthur helped a defeated and destroyed nation transform itself with remarkable speed.

Students of the occupation period are stunned by how readily the Japanese remade their country along an American model. Although this is often ascribed to the particular Japanese talent for adapting foreign concepts for their own use, many of the changes wrought during the occupation had roots in pre-war Japanese reform movements. Still, MacArthur's prestige was such that his support could make or break almost any single cause. Among those encouraged by MacArthur and his staff were democratic elections ("This is democracy!" he exclaimed after the elections of 1947) basic civil liberties, including steps toward equality for women the unionization of labor, despite his banning of a General Strike in January, 1947 land reform, which sought to "eliminate the feudal system of land tenure and remove obstacles to the redistribution of land" and the Japanese Constitution itself, particularly Article 9 outlawing war and guarding against remilitarization. Even with all of these accomplishments, MacArthur's greatest disappointment may have been his failure to convert the Japanese masses to Christianity, despite his conviction that "true democracy can exist only on a spiritual foundation," and will "endure when it rests firmly on the Christian conception of the individual and society."

Appropriately, MacArthur established his General Headquarters, or GHQ, in the Dai Ichi Insurance Building in central Tokyo, the higher floors of which overlooked the Imperial Palace. MacArthur's steadfast resolution to protect Emperor Hirohito -- "through him it will be possible to maintain a completely orderly government" -- probably ranks as the single most important decision of the occupation. Considering how well things went, MacArthur's decision seems vindicated yet many historians argue that once the occupation had begun to run smoothly, MacArthur should have allowed the Emperor to abdicate the throne, thereby acknowledging his and the country's responsibility for the war. As historian John Dower says, "From the Japanese perspective, you have a man who becomes America's symbol of democracy, who is totally sanitized by the Americans and by MacArthur, in particular. I think that that poisoned the thinking about responsibility in general, in Japan, to the present day."

Nonetheless, it is remarkable that a man best known as one of the greatest soldiers in American history may have made his greatest contribution during a time of peace. Significantly, MacArthur biographer D. Clayton James once wrote that he decided to undertake his three volume study "with the conviction that a century hence MacArthur will be most appreciated for his role as an administrator, rather than as a warrior."

Creation of the Japanese Constitution:
From the very beginning, it was clear that a primary objective of the occupation of Japan would be, as the Potsdam Declaration put it, "a peacefully inclined and responsible government" based on "the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." MacArthur himself commented early on that meeting this goal would certainly require a "revision of the Meiji Constitution." But even he could not have imagined that a few months later, his young American staff would write an entirely new constitution, one that has governed Japanese affairs ever since without the change of a comma.

The whole undertaking was a bit bizarre from the start. On October 4, 1945, toward the end of a meeting with MacArthur, a high-ranking Japanese cabinet member asked whether the supreme commander had any instructions "about the make-up of the government." The translator mistakenly used the word "constitution" for "make-up," and the official left thinking that MacArthur had commissioned him to draft a new constitution. The Japanese did go to work, but MacArthur rejected their efforts in early February 1946 as "nothing more than a rewording of the old Meiji constitution." Eager to avoid interference from other allies, MacArthur took matters into his own hands. He ordered his government section to draft a document themselves, and to do it before the first meeting of the Far Eastern Commission, set for February 26. Staff member Beate Sirota Gordon, then in her early twenties, still remembers the day well:

And one morning I came in. it was ten a.m. and General Whitney [head of the government section] called us into a meeting room. It was too small for all of us. Some of us had to stand because there were about 25 of us. And he said, "You are now a constituent assembly." You can imagine how we felt. "And you will write the Japanese constitution. You will write a draft and it will have to be done in a week." Well, I mean, we were stunned of course. But, on the other hand, when you're in the army and you get an order, you just do it. You just go ahead.

Mrs. Gordon then recounts how she raced around the still-decimated Tokyo in a jeep, collecting all of the foreign constitutions she could find to provide models for the new "constituent assembly."

Their work resulted in a thoroughly progressive document. Although the emperor was acknowledged as the head of state, he was stripped of any real power and essentially became a constitutional monarch. A bi-cameral legislature with a weak upper chamber was established, and with the exception of the Imperial family, all rights of peerage were abolished. Thirty-nine articles dealt with what MacArthur called "basic human liberties," including not only most of the American bill of rights, but such things as universal adult sufferage, labor's right to organize, and a host of marriage and property rights for women. But the most unique and one of the most important provisions came in Article 9, which outlawed the creation of armed forces and the right to make war. It's not clear whether or not the "No-war clause" originated with MacArthur, but it certainly would not have been included without him, and its presence in the constitution has had an enormous impact on Japan's postwar history.

After marathon negotiations in early March, Japanese officials accepted the American draft with only minor revisions. General Whitney's comment at the outset -- "if the cabinet [is] unable to prepare a suitable and acceptable draft. General MacArthur [is] prepared to lay this statement of principle directly before the people" -- probably helped. Emperor Hirohito, chagrined at having lost so much power but grateful that the throne had been retained, issued an "imperial rescript" endorsing the draft. That fall, after the Japanese people had voted overwhelmingly for candidates who backed the new consitution, Hirohito himself promulgated it before the Diet (Japanese Parliament). Although it ignored his own role in its birth, General MacArthur's message to the nation offered a pretty fair assessment: "The adoption of this liberal charter, together with other progressive measures enacted by the Diet, lays a very solid foundation for the new Japan."